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role it plays in the system."  
  (Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science) 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this working paper is to explore one of the political premises of the current 
violence in Algeria, namely the character of the identity politics which has developed in the 
Berberophone Kabylia region of the country, which has this year been the theatre of the most 
sustained riots in Algeria’s history, and the first riots of any significance to have occurred in 
Algeria since October 1988. A secondary, theoretical, purpose is to demonstrate and establish 
the analytical value of the concepts of forms of politics and political mutation which have 
been central to my work for many years but remain to be generally taken up and put to use in 
contemporary political studies. 
 
It is a striking and important fact about the riots of October 1988, which heralded the 
subsequent dismantling of the FLN-state, that, whereas they quickly spread from Algiers to 
other parts of the country, they did not spread to Kabylia, despite the fact that the region’s 
capital, Tizi Ouzou, is a mere 60 miles from Algiers and that a large percentage of the Algiers 
population are Kabyle. It is an equally striking feature of the recent riots that, while they have 
also spread to, or at least been imitated in, other parts of Algeria, especially in the east of the 
country, they have not (so far) spread to Algiers itself, in the sense of infecting the Algiers 
population, and that the only disturbances which have taken place in Algiers in connection 
with these riots have occurred when the Kabyle protestors have come to Algiers en masse, as 
on June 14 last, to organise demonstrations of their own in the city. 
 
The disturbances this year, in Kabylia and elsewhere, have exhibited three remarkable 
contrasts to the 1988 riots.  
 
In 1988, the régime very quickly declared a state of siege and called on the army to restore 
order, whereas throughout this year’s disturbances the army (as distinct from the 
gendarmerie, which has always been present in the region as a matter of course) has not 
intervened at all.1 
 
The death toll this year, while entirely deplorable - at over 100 killed as well as many injured 
over seven months, is of a different order from the several hundred killed in 1988 over a mere 
six days.2 
 
The 1988 riots, although of exceptional intensity, were rapidly brought to an end; having 
begun in Algiers on the night of October 4, and having spread across the country by October 
9, they nonetheless ended everywhere on the night of October 10. This year’s riots, which 
began in Kabylia on April 23, not only continued throughout the summer but still cannot be 
said as of now (early December) to have been brought to a complete end.3 
 
                                                 
1 The gendarmerie is charged with maintaining order in the Algerian countryside and - unlike the Surêté 
Nationale, which has this responsibility in the towns and comes under the interior ministry - it comes under the 
ministry of defence and its commander is a member of the army general staff 
2 The official death toll in 1988 was 159 (Libération, October 24, 1988), while unofficial estimates ranged from 
400 to over 600 dead (Le Monde, October 25, 1988). No official casualty figures have been published for the 
whole of the 2001 disturbances. A provisional but detailed list established independently by Dr Salah Eddine 
Sidhoum gives the figure of 95 people killed in the Kabyle disturbances (including 9 killed in demonstrations 
organized by the Kabyles in Algiers) between late April and June, 2001; two other people were killed in 
separate disturbances south-eastern Algeria; see Salah Eddine Sidhoum, Liste non-exhaustive des victimes des 
émeutes en Algérie, Avril-Juin 2001 , Algeria-Watch, June 2001 (http://www.algeria-watch.org) 
3 For an early analysis of the dynamics of the riots which explained why they repeatedly resumed after every 
lull, see my article, ‘Algeria: riots without end?’ in Middle East International, 651 (June 1, 2001), 16-18. 
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But the 2001 riots have had at least one major feature in common with those of 1988. In both 
cases, the principal object of the rioters’ anger was what Algerians call la hogra (in standard 
Arabic, el-hagra), by which they mean the contempt with which they are treated by the 
authorities and the humiliations heaped upon them as their notional rights are routinely 
violated by official abuses of power. That this was wha t was at issue was immediately 
recognised by the coverage of the initial disturbances by the independent Algerian press, 
many of whose reporters are Kabyles.4 And it was because the rioters in Kabylia made it 
clear that their principal grievance was la hogra that their actions struck a chord elsewhere 
and their revolt proved contagious beyond Kabylia. 
 
However, notwithstanding the clearly expressed outlook of the rioters, one of the two 
political parties based on the Kabyle constituency, the Rally for Culture and Democracy 
(Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, RCD), published a series of declarations 
in the early stages of the riots which proffered an entirely different view of what was at 
issue.5 Instead of articulating the Kabyles’ rejection of la hogra, notably their anger at the 
behaviour of the local gendarmerie which had precipitated the disturbances6 and, more 
generally, their anger at the socio-economic distress – mass unemployment, inadequate 
housing, etc. – they suffered in consequence of the government’s neglect of and indifference 
to their interests, grievances which tended to unite the Kabyles with their fellow-Algerians in 
all other parts of the country, 7 the RCD insisted that the main source of Kabyle frustration 
and anger was the identity question and specifically the government’s longstanding refusal to 
accord national and official status to the Berber language, Thamazighth,8 an issue which 
clearly distinguished, and tended to isolate, the population of Kabylia from those of other 
regions and thus to forfeit the sympathy and support of the rest of Algerian public opinion. 
 
That the Algerian authorities considered they had an interest in defining the problem in terms 
of the identity and language issue cannot be doubted. As early as April 30, President 
                                                 
4 See Ahmed Kaci, ‘Colère pour une dignité’ in La Tribune, April 25, and especially his article in La Tribune, 
April 28, where he wrote: “Ce serait un…crime que de réduire le ras-le-bol actuel des jeunes, parce que 
s’exprimant pour l’instant en Kabylie, à la question linguistique et identitaire.” See also the article 
‘L’amalgame’ in El Watan, April 29, and the report by Abla Cherif in Le Matin, April 30, which quotes a 
demonstrator at Ourzellaguen in Lesser Kabylia as saying that: “Il est faux de croire que la révolte a éclaté pour 
revendiquer tamazight.” Even the French press was initially forced to recognize the truth of the matter; see José 
Garçon’s article in Libération, April 28-29 and also Le Monde, April 30. 
5 Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie: Déclaration du Bureau Régional du RCD de Bejaïa, Bejaïa, 
April 24; Le Comité Exécutif met le régime devant ses responsabilités (declaration of RCD Executive 
Committee) Algiers, April 25; La situation est grave (RCD communiqué), Algiers, April 28, 2001; source: RCD 
internet bulletin, April 2001 (http://rcd-algérie.org/avril/avril.htm). 
6 The immediate trigger of the riots were three provocative incidents which occurred in rapid succession: the 
unexplained fatal shooting of a youth, Massinissa Guermah, in the offices of the gendarmerie at Beni Douala 
(wilaya of Tizi Ouzou) on April 18; the gratuitously offensive terms of the communiqué subsequently issued by 
the gendarmerie, accusing Guermah of being a thief, and the brutal arrest of three pupils at a school at Oued 
Amizour (wilaya of Bejaia) on the flimsiest of pretexts on April 22. Non-violent protest demonstrations began at 
Beni Douala on April 21 and spread across the region from April 23 onwards, developing quickly into riots as 
clashes occurred with the local gendarmerie in dozens of different places. 
7 Strictly circumscribed and largely non-violent protests against local misgovernment at municipal level have 
been occurring in most regions of Algeria for the last year or more; local discontent developed into riots in the 
wake of the Kabyle events in many parts of the Constantinois from June onwards; they have since spread to the 
Oranie (western Algeria). 
8 Usually written Tamazight in Algeria, following French practice, although the ‘t’ is pronounced as the ‘th’ in 
English. In addition to official statements, we may note the declaration on April 26 of Djamel Ferdjallah, the 
RCD’s Vice-President and one of the party’s deputies for the wilaya (administrative region) of Bejaia, that 
“these demonstrations are an expression of deep resentment by the Berber population over its identity and 
cultural claims” (Reuters). 
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Bouteflika implied that this was the main issue in a televised address to the nation in which, 
having formally acknowledged the problems which Kabylia shares with other regions, he 
then proceeded to dwell on “la crise identitaire”, insisting on the progress which the state 
had already made towards addressing this but also noting that the identity claim had “a 
constitutional dimension which could only be addressed in the context of a revision to the 
constitution”. 9 Five months later, Bouteflika announced that the awarding to Thamazighth of 
the status of a ‘national language’ previously accorded to Arabic alone would indeed be on 
the agenda of the constitutional revision now in prospect.10 Instead of being greeted with 
triumphant rejoicing or even sober satisfaction in Kabylia, however, this announcement 
received an unenthusiastic, cynical and in some cases hostile reception in the region, and 
appeared to resolve nothing. 11 
 
This is the first complex of issues which this paper seeks to address. A second question 
concerns a distinct aspect of the recent disturbances. 
 
In 1988, the riotous behaviour of the demonstrators, the generally destructive actions they 
undertook, and especially those directed against the offices of the sole legal political 
formation, the Party of the FLN (Parti du Front de Libération Nationale, Hizb Jebhat el-
Tahrir el-Wataniyya), were widely explained in terms of the monolithic character of the 
political system and the lack of institutional outlets for popular anger given the Party’s 
monopoly of public life; the riots were therefore widely cited, especially in the French press, 
as grounds for dismantling the FLN-state and establishing political pluralism,12 and were in 
fact followed quite rapidly by this development. 
 
Yet the riots this year have occurred precisely in conditions of political pluralism. The 
population of Kabylia has been represented in the National Assembly (the lower, elective, 
house of the Algerian parliament) since this was re-established in June 1997, and it has, 
moreover, been represented by its own, home-grown, regionally-based parties, which have 
between them held almost every one of the region’s seats.13 It has also been represented in 
the Council of the Nation (the upper house of the parliament) since this was established in 
December 1997, both among the indirectly elected members who make up two thirds of its 
composition and among the remaining third who owe their seats to presidential 
appointment.14 Given the general condition of political pluralism, and given the political 
representation of the Kabylia region by Kabyle parties – given, that is to say, precisely those 
                                                 
9 Texte intégral de la declaration du Président de la Republique, 30 avril 2001, Algeria-Watch 
(http://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/kabylie/discours_boutef.htm). 
10 Communiqué of the Presidency of the Republic, October 3, 2001. 
11 See Libération, ‘L’annonce faites aux berbères’ ; and Le Monde, ‘Confusion en Kabylie après la 
reconnaissance du berbère’, both on October 5, 2001. 
12 See in particular the articles of Bernard Cohen in Libération, November 3 and November 5-6, 1988, and the 
text of the resolution passed by the European Parliament on November 17, 1988 (reported in Libération , 
November 18, 1988). 
13 In the legislative elections of June 1997, all 14 seats of the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou (Greater Kabylia) went to the 
Kabyle parties, the FFS and the RCD, and were shared equally between them; in the wilaya of Bejaia (Lesser 
Kabylia), the FFS took seven seats to the RCD’s three, and one seat was taken by the moderate Islamist party, 
the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP). The votes cast by the Kabyle element of the adjacent or nearby 
wilayât of Algiers, Boumerdès, Bouïra and Tipasa also translated into seats for the FFS and RCD (six a-piece); 
from the émigré population in France and North America, much of which is of Kabyle origin, the RCD picked 
up three seats. 
14 Each of Algeria’s 48 wilayât is represented in the Council of the Nation by two members, elected by the 
members of the wilaya’s popular assembly (APW) and its communal popular assemblies (APCs) from among 
their own number.  
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political conditions the absence of which was cited as explaining in large part the resort to 
rioting to express popular grievances in 1988, why should the recent massive riots have 
occurred at all? And why should some of the rioters in Kabylia have included among their 
targets the offices of the Kabyle political parties as well as those unequivocally associated 
with the régime?15 
 
This paper does not provide a political analysis of the recent riots, which have been an 
exceptionally complex affair and are not yet fully over as we have seen. It offers instead a 
preliminary analysis of the form of identity politics which has oriented the behaviour of a 
crucial actor in these events, the RCD, and which has been permitted to develop within the 
constitutional framework of formal pluralism established since the dismantling of the FLN-
state. As such it represents research in progress, which it is intended that subsequent work 
will develop and if necessary correct. It should be emphasized that this paper deals 
exclusively with Algerian Berberism, and that its analysis should not be assumed to apply to 
the Berberist movements which have developed elsewhere in North Africa in recent years. 
Beyond the Algerian context, however, a purpose of this paper is nonetheless to contribute to 
the debate about the character of identity politics and political pluralism in contemporary 
developing countries, as well as of the political premises of the popular resort to violence in 
formally pluralist states.  
 
 
Enigma variations  
Sharp changes of political direction are often symptoms of a crisis of some kind, and a crisis 
is often a favourable context in which to appraise a form of politics, revealing as it does what 
is optional and what is essential to it and so enabling the analyst to distinguish between the 
two. Let us begin, therefore, by considering two dramatic U-turns in recent Algerian political 
life. 
 
In the course of the 1999 presidential election, which brought Abdelaziz Bouteflika back to 
high office with the support of powerful factions of the Algerian army and administration, 
one political party adopted a posture which may have appeared to outflank all other forces 
present in respect of commitment to democratic principle and political radicalism. This party 
was the RCD. Instead of either rallying to the pro-Bouteflika coalition composed of four 
substantial parties - the regime-sponsored National Liberation Front (Front de Libération 
Nationale, FLN), the equally regime-sponsored Democratic National Rally (Rassemblement 
National Démocratique, RND) and the 'moderate' Islamists of the Movement of Society for 
Peace (MSP) and Ennahda - or supporting any of the six other candidates in the race, or even 
putting forward its own candidate, the RCD called for an outright boycott of the election on 
the grounds that it was rigged in advance. A few months later, the RCD leaders announced 
the rallying of their party to the coalition of parties supporting President Bouteflika's position 
in the National Assembly. They did this despite not only their own emphatically expressed 
views concerning the undemocratic manner in which Bouteflika had been ‘elected’, but also 
despite Bouteflika's publicly declared refusal to accept their demand for national and official 
status for the Berber language, and despite his insistence on seeking some form of 
reconciliation with the RCD's bête noire, the Algerian Islamist movement (and thus his tacit 
                                                 
15 Between April 23 and June 20, at least 32 offices of political parties were sacked or set on fire by rioters in 
Kabylia. While these incidents might be considered self-explanatory in the case of those parties permanently 
associated with the régime, the FLN and the RND (14 and 4 offices attacked respectively), the attacks on the 
Kabyle parties, the FFS and the RCD, both of which had seven offices destroyed, remain to be explained. 
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rejection of the RCD’s vision of a secular state).  In reward for placing their principal 
programmatic objectives on the long finger in this manner, their party was subsequently 
allocated two portfolios (health and transport) in the new government announced on 
December 24, 1999, which, consisting entirely of men, tacitly expressed Bouteflika’s 
additional indifference to the RCD’s third major concern, female equality. 
 
The inconsistent behaviour of the RCD in 1999 obviously calls for explanation. This first U-
turn can now be considered in the light of a second one, which occurred immediately after the 
defining moment of the party’s line and conduct since late April of this year (2001), that is 
during the massive riots which have occurred in the RCD’s home region of Kabylia. For, 
having reversed its principled opposition to Bouteflika and joined his government in 1999, on 
May 1, 2001 the RCD reversed itself all over again and pulled out of the government à grand 
fracas. 
 
A cynical interpretation of the RCD’s volte-face in July 1999 would be that the RCD leaders 
sold their souls for the political equivalent of a mess of pottage (what Algerians would refer 
to as a seat near the couscousier), and that the RCD's own principles went comprehensively 
by the board in the transaction in question. In line with this view of things, one might suppose 
(as many observers and commentators have in fact suggested) that, when the RCD decided to 
leave the government in May 2001, this meant either that it had reverted to better sentiments 
and resumed its original, natural and proper function of representing Kabyle opinion in the 
more straightforward medium of explicit opposition, or that it had simply acted 
opportunistically once again, in jumping off the government’s mired and immobilized coach 
onto the dynamic bandwagon of the mass movement in Kabylia while the going was good. 
 
I want to argue that this view, in all of its variants, however plausible, is essentially mistaken. 
Whatever truth it contains is of superficial significance only. For the RCD leaders were not 
substantively departing from their previous political orientation in executing the volte-face of 
July 1999, and the second 180-degree turn they executed in May 2001 - whether one 
entertains a cynical or charitable interpretation of it - also did not amount to a genuine 
reversal of the party line or a fundamental shift in its political allegiances at all. That this is so 
is closely connected to the fact that the explanation for the RCD's behaviour is not primarily 
to be sought in the opportunism of its leaders, but in the character of the form of politics from 
which the party has sprung, namely Berberism, a form of ideology-laden identity politics 
which has been widely misconceived by most detached observers as well as many of its 
adepts. 
 
Berberism 
Berberism in Algeria is above all a dissident political position which has developed with 
respect to the Kabyle question in Algerian politics.  
 
If the term is abstracted from its historical context, one might define it as simply the concern 
to affirm and promote the Berber identity, as Arabism and Islamism have been concerned to 
promote the Arab and Islamic identities respectively, with whatever these have been 
understood to imply in respect of language, culture, faith and morals. Many of those who 
have belonged to the Berberist movement as a movement of ideas have sought to promote the 
Berber language and culture, as Arabists have sought to promote Arabic language and 
culture, and have been seen - and have seen themselves - as acting in the cultural sphere 
rather than the political sphere. In this perspective, the Berberist movement can be traced 
back to the early years of the twentieth century. The work of a Berber intellectual, Amar ou 
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Saïd Boulifa, can be seen as an important moment in the gestation of the Berberist project,16 
and contemporary Berberists explicitly claim Boulifa as a forerunner of their own vision.17 
The affirmation of the Berber identity was also a central element of the work of Jean 
Amrouche (1906-1962) and his sister, Marguerite Taos Amrouche (1913-1976).18 More 
recently, and especially since Algeria’s independence in 1962, the development of the 
Berberist movement as a cultural enterprise has owed a great deal to the work of the novelist 
and essayist Mouloud Mammeri (1917-1989),19 a degree of theorization of the movement has 
been provided most notably by Salem Chaker (b. 1950),20 and the popularisation of Berberist 
themes in the wider social consciousness has owed much to the appeal of a number of singer-
poets, notably Slimane Azem (1918-1983), Idir (b. 1948), Lounis Aït Menguellet (b. 1950), 
Ferhat Mehenni (b. 1951) and Matoub Lounes (1956-1998).  
 
But to view the Berberist movement as an essentially apolitical movement of ideas evolving 
mainly if not entirely in the cultural sphere is to overlook the fact that the cultural sphere and 
the political sphere have not been truly distinct, let alone separate, in Algeria since the French 
conquest in 1830, and is to ignore the political content of much of the intellectual and artistic 
output of leading figures in this movement, notably Chaker but also the singers mentioned 
above (especially Mehenni and Matoub). And to abstract the consideration of Algerian 
Berberism from the historical context in which it has developed over the last half century 
disables the external observer from appreciating the political significance of this movement, 
and makes the reactions to it of other tendencies in Algerian public life incomprehensible. 
For the Berberist movement has been a highly political affair from early on, and its impact on 
Algerian politics has been immense. 
                                                 
16 Amar ou Saïd (sometimes written Ammar Bensaïd) Boulifa (1870-1931) was the author notably of Recueil de 
poesies berbères, Algiers : Jourdan, 1905; Méthode de langue kabyle, cours de deuxième année, Algiers: 
Jourdan, 1913; Le Djurdjura à travers l’histoire: organisation et indépendance des Zouaoua, Algiers : J. 
Bringau, 1925. 
17 Salem Chaker, ‘Documents sur les précurseurs: A.S. Boulifa et M. A. Lechani’, in S. Chaker, ed., Berbères: 
une identité en construction, special issue of Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 44 (October 
1987), 97-115. 
18 Jean (El-Mouhoub) Amrouche was the son of Kabyle parents converted to Christianity; his mother, Fadhma 
Aïth Mansour Amrouche, wrote a remarkable autobiography, Histoire de ma vie (Paris, 1968; republished by La 
Découverte, 2000). A prominent figure in Franco-Algerian letters in the last three decades of the colonial era, he 
was the author notably of Chants berbères de Kabylie , Paris, 1939, republished in Paris by L’Harmattan in 
1986, and of the famous essay, ‘L’éternel Jugurtha: propositions sur le génie africain’, L’Arche (Paris), 13 
(1946), 58-70; his sister Marie-Louise (Marguerite Taos) Amrouche was the author of Le grain maqique, Paris: 
F. Maspero, 1966 (republished by La Découverte, 1994) and other works; a remarkable singer, she produced a 
celebrated album entitled Chants berbères de Kabylie in 1965. 
19 Mammeri, who tragically died in a car accident on February 25, 1989, is widely regarded as the intellectual 
giant of Algerian Berberism, the author of numerous novels (in French), notably La colline oubliée, Paris: Plon, 
1952; Le sommeil du juste, Paris: Plon, 1955; L’opium et le baton, Paris: Plon, 1965; as well as the editor of 
important collections of Kabyle poetry, Les isefra: poèmes de Si Mohand ou M’Hand, Paris: Maspero, 1969 and 
Poèmes kabyles anciens, Paris: Maspero, 1980; he held the chair of Berber at the University of Algiers from 
1967 until this was abolished in the early 1970s; from March 1969, he was also the director of the Centre de 
Recherche en Anthropologie Préhistorique et Ethnographique (CRAPE) at Algiers, in which capacity he 
inspired many other researchers and especially oversaw research on the various Berber dialects in Algeria and 
the production of dictionaries.  
20 Salem Chaker is professor of Berber at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales 
(INALCO) in Paris and has been the director of its Centre de Recherches Berbères since this was established in 
1990. He is the author of numerous studies in Berber linguistics and other more general works, notably Berbères 
aujourd’hui, Paris, 1989 (republished by L’Harmattan, 1998) and Une décennie d’études berbères, 1980-1990, 
Algiers: Bouchène, 1992. 
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The term ‘Berberist’ first gained wide currency in 1948-1949 when it was employed by the 
leadership of the main Algerian nationalist party, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des 
Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD - a legal front for the banned and accordingly clandestine 
Parti du Peuple Algérien, PPA) to refer to, and stigmatise, a dissident minority, led by a 
certain Rachid Ali Yahia, within the leadership of the PPA-MTLD - and especially its French 
extension, the Fédération de France du MTLD, of which Ali Yahia was the secretary - which 
had put forward the notion of ‘l'Algérie Algérienne’ in opposition to the longstanding 
orthodoxy of the PPA-MTLD that the Algerian nation was properly defined as ‘l'Algérie 
arabo-musulmane’.  
 
The concept of ‘Arabo-Muslim Algeria’ withheld explicit recognition from the Berber 
aspects of Algerian society and culture. By proposing ‘Algerian Algeria’, the dissidents were 
not explicitly denying either the Arab or the Muslim elements of the national culture, but 
were contesting the definition of the nation in terms of these two elements, and were thus 
holding out for an entirely open conception, within which the Berber elements of Algerian 
society and culture might be at least tacitly acknowledged.  
 
Although they were not advancing an exclusively Berber conception of the nation (such as 
might have been expressed in the slogan l'Algérie berbère, for example), the dissidents were 
denounced as ‘Berberists’ for the ir pains, and this for a combination of two reasons. First, as 
Kabyles, they were, in fact, Berbers. And, second, in challenging the nationalist orthodoxy of 
‘Arabo-Muslim Algeria’, they were open to being seen, and were certainly portrayed, as 
dividing the nationalist movement in the face of the enemy along precisely the same fault line 
which French colonialism had perennially exploited in its strategy of dividing the Algerians, 
namely the Kabyle-Arab dichotomy.21 
 
For Berberism in its inception was a peculiarly Kabyle affair. In addition to Ali Yahia and his 
associates, all the figures mentioned earlier as having played leading roles in the development 
of the Berberism as an intellectual and cultural movement, from Boulifa to Matoub, have 
been Kabyles. And, while it would be a mistake to define Algerian Berberism as an 
exclusively Kabyle movement, since there is in principle nothing to stop a Shawi Berber from 
the Aurès or an Ibadi Berber from the Mzab, etc. (to look no further) from developing a 
‘Berberist’ outlook and several Shawi and Mzabi intellectuals have done so in recent years, it 
has in fact remained an overwhelmingly Kabyle affair.  
 
I explained in detail over twenty years ago why this should be the case,22 and will not repeat 
this explanation here beyond mentioning the most immediate element of it, the fact that the 
French language replaced Arabic as the second language of the Kabyles in the course of the 
colonial period (primarily as a consequence of the impact of mass labour migration to France 
from the first world war onwards), whereas this never happened in the Aurès or the Mzab. 
But it may be noted that developments since the early 1980s have thoroughly confirmed my 
                                                 
21 For an excellent study of the development and exploitation of the Kabyle-Arab dichotomy in French colonial 
ideology and policy, see Patricia M.E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial 
Algeria, London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1995. 
22 Hugh Roberts, ‘Towards an understanding of the Kabyle question in contemporary Algeria’, The Maghreb 
Review, V, 5-6, September-December 1980, 115-124; ‘The unforeseen development of the Kabyle question in 
contemporary Algeria’, Government and Opposition , XVII, 3 (Summer 1982), 312-334 ; ‘The economics of 
Berberism: the material basis of the Kabyle question in contemporary Algeria’, Government and Opposition, 
XVIII, 2 (Spring 1983), 218-235; see also my doctoral thesis, Political development in Algeria: the region of 
Greater Kabylia, D.Phil., Oxford University, 1980, published as Algerian socialism and the Kabyle question, 
University of East Anglia, Monographs in Development Studies, No. 8, 1981. 
 9
original assessment of Berberism in Algeria as an essentially Kabyle affair. For, when the 
advent of the pluralist constitution in 1989 permitted virtually all points of view in Algerian 
society to express themselves in the party-political sphere, it was striking that neither the 
Shawiyya nor the Mzabis supported the Berberist position as developed by the Kabyle-based 
RCD, nor did they secrete Berberist parties of their own. The Mzabis (whose particularism is 
as much a function of their religious specificity - their adherence to the Ibadi variant of 
Kharejism - as of their Berber speech) voted for independent candidates in 1990 and 1991, 
and the Shawiyya scorned particularist political options altogether, voting in more or less 
equal numbers for the establishment FLN and its main challenger, the Islamic Salvation Front 
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS), in 1990, and for the most part either abstaining or voting FIS 
in 1991. 
 
In other words, neither the Shawiyya nor the Mzabis have been disposed to contest the 
official definition of the Algerian nation as l'Algérie arabo-musulmane. In voting for their 
own independent candidates, the Mzabis were unobtrusively expressing and defending their 
particular interests while abstaining from contesting the self-definition of the larger whole 
within which they are situated. And in voting for the FLN or the FIS, the Shawiyya were 
voting for alternative political expressions of broadly the same conception - or at most 
choosing between closely related conceptions - of the nation. 23 Only the Kabyles have been 
disposed to canvass and support a politics which vehicles a conception of their identity which 
is explicitly at odds with the official conception.  
 
This conception is not only opposed to the official conception at the level of abstract ideas, it 
is clearly subversive of the unity of the Algerian nation-state as this was constituted at the end 
of the war of national liberation in 1962. Why, then, should the Kabyles have been allowed to 
express this subversive outlook? Why should Algeria's rulers have indulged the Berberist 
point of view since 1989, when the nationalist leadership acted decisively to suppress it in 
1949? Part of the answer to this question is to be found in the ambiguity, if not confusion, at 
the heart of Kabyle Berberism. 
 
Language and identity, 1948-1980 
‘Berber’ is primarily a linguistic category. Ethnically, nearly all Algerians might be described 
as Berbers, in that the number of Arabs who came to Algeria in the 7th and 11th centuries 
was relatively small, and these intermarried freely with the native Berber population, such 
that most Algerians for many generations past have been descended from, among others, 
Berber ancestors, whatever language they have since come to speak.24 As a result, in recent 
times the term ‘Berber’ has had a clear meaning, in opposition to ‘Arab’, only in respect of 
                                                 
23 I have distinguished elsewhere between the ‘Arabo-Muslim’ conception of the Algerian identity – l’Algérie 
arabo-musulmane - favoured by the nationalist movement prior to independence and by the FLN-state after 
1962 from the Islamist conception – l’Algérie islamique – canvassed by the radical Islamist movement, notably 
by the FIS since 1989; see my article ‘Historical and unhistorical approaches to the problem of identity in 
Algeria’, Bulletin of Francophone Africa, 4 (Autumn 1993), 79-92. However, there has always been a good deal 
of overlap between the two. The difference is that  the champions of the Arabo-Muslim conception have tended 
to be emphatic about the political implications of the ‘Arab’ aspect of this (viz. the Arabisation policy) while far 
vaguer about the implications of the ‘Muslim’ aspect; with the Islamist conception of the national identity, this 
distribution of certainty and vagueness is to some extent reversed in a vigorous insistence on the need for an 
Islamic state accompanied by a somewhat less doctrinaire attitude towards language policy, which while 
championing Arabic has tended to be open-minded about Thamazighth. 
24 We should not overlook the importance of specifically Arab ancestry in the case of certain elements of the 
Algerian population, especially the Beduin tribes of the High Plateaux and parts of the Sahara, a substantial 
number of which are able to claim descent from the Hilalian invaders of the 11th century with some conviction. 
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that element of the Algerian population which has continued to speak one or another dialect 
of the Berber language as its mother tongue, an element which is probably at least 20 per cent 
but no more than 25 per cent of the total. 
 
If ‘Berberism’ was essentially a movement asserting the right to official recognition of the 
Berber language, one could understand it primarily as the expression of an entirely natural 
material interest, and one which Algeria's rulers might have found it both possible and politic 
to accommodate. But not only did the nationalist leadership in 1949, and the rulers of 
independent Algeria from 1962 to 1978, refuse any compromise with ‘Berberism’ along these 
lines, but leading advocates of the Berberist cause during the 1980s denied that their 
movement vehicled a material interest at all, insisting instead that it vehicled a distinctive 
identity, and explicitly counter-posing the question of identity to that of material interest.25 
This view of the matter has received sustained and voluble endorsement in French media 
coverage and academic commentary. It has become a commonplace of contemporary French 
discussion of Algeria's painful crisis to assert that this crisis is a crisis of identity, and, 
moreover, one which concerns all Algerians equally, and by no means the Berbers, still less 
the Kabyles, alone. 
 
There is a definite logic in this view. To assert that Berberism expresses a preoccupation with 
identity, and to observe that the Kabyles in particular have an identity problem, is to subvert 
the notion of Algerian identity. It is to deny that it is possible for the Kabyles, qua Berbers, to 
be content with their identity as Algerians, and thus to put in question the Algerian identity in 
general. 
 
When I became aware, in the course of my field work in Kabylia in the mid-1970s, that the 
Kabyle question was far from resolved, and was, on the contrary, acquiring a far broader 
social basis in the Kabylia region and the Kabyle population than it had possessed in 1949,26 I 
suggested that this change was due to the cultural implications of economic and social change 
in the region since independence, such that the Kabyle population as a whole had acquired a 
substantial material interest in the status of its mother tongue. I pointed out that, while there 
had long existed a Kabyle bourgeoisie, this bourgeoisie had both become more integrated and 
unified than before as economic development had expanded and unified the Kabyle market, 
and had acquired a stake in the Berber language agitation as the government's socialist and 
Arabisation policies had simultaneously reduced the scope for private sector entrepreneurs 
and made them more dependent than ever on the public sector bureaucracy, in which Kabyle 
representation was severely threatened by the progress of Arabisation. 27 I accordingly argued 
that the new wave of ‘Berberism’ which began to develop as an agitational movement in 
Kabylia from the mid-1970s onwards vehiculed, at bottom, the interest of the Kabyle 
bourgeoisie, but that this agitation was well able to mobilise public opinion in general by 
virtue of kinship links which easily transcended class distinctions, and that the government 
accordingly had an interest in conceding the demand for official recognition of the Berber 
language, in order to disarm the development of a politics which was simultaneously 
subversive of national unity and inimical to its socialist policies.  
 
                                                 
25 Salem Chaker, ‘Critique d’un mythe: à propos des bases sociales du mouvement berbère’, Tafsut, No. 2, 1985, 
pp. 39-52. 
26 The nationalist leadership had no difficulty in securing the services of locally influential Kabyle activists to 
suppress the Berberist tendency in Kabylia in 1949, whereas matters were very different in this respect in 1980. 
27 Roberts (1980 & 1983). 
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That the Algerian authorities proved incapable of adopting this position is not, in itself, proof 
that my analysis was mistaken. But the behaviour of the Berberists themselves since 1980 
might be thought to be another matter. For while it is incontrovertible that the scale of 
popular support in Kabylia for the Berberist agitation in 1980 and thereafter has confirmed 
my assessment of the degree and character of social change in the region since 1962, the 
actual perspectives of the leading Berberists over the last twenty-one years have not been 
significantly different from their predecessors in 1949, in that the status of the Berber 
language has not been their real concern. 
 
That the status of the Kabyle (or, more broadly, Berber) language was not really at issue in 
1949 is clear from two facts.  
 
First, the ‘Berberist’ advocates of l'Algérie algérienne made no practical proposal that the 
leadership of the PPA-MTLD might consider in respect of this status. As Omar Carlier has 
pointed out, they did not suggest that the nationalist conception of the Algerian nation might 
be modified to accommodate Kabyle concern over the language issue, by substituting the 
notion of l'Algérie arabo-berbère et musulmane for the notion of l'Algérie arabo-musulmane, 
nor did they put forward any other constructive suggestion. 28 Two other options which were 
open to them to canvass were the idea of l'Algérie arabo-berbère (i.e. dropping the explicit 
reference to Islam while keeping Arabic and Berber on an equal footing) or l'Algérie 
musulmane (affirming the nation's Muslim character while keeping the Arabic and Berber 
languages on an equal footing by omitting explicit references to either of them). The 
‘Berberists’ did none of these things. They merely challenged the long-standing (and widely 
accepted) conception of the cultural content of Algeria nationality in the name of a 
conception which had no specific cultural content at all. 
 
Second, while Carlier provides a sociological and historical explanation for the fact that some 
Kabyle intellectuals should, by 1949, have developed an outlook which put them at odds with 
the mainstream of Algerian nationalism, a point he neglects to mention is that the person 
who, more than any other at that time, personified a developing Kabyle interest in the Berber 
language, Mohand Amokrane Khelifati, was not one of the ‘Berberists’ in 1949, but was, on 
the contrary, enlisted by Kabyle opponents of the ‘Berberist’ grouping in an effort to induce 
them to abandon their agitation before it did serious damage to the unity of the nationalist 
party as a whole.29 Khelifati accepted this commission, and traveled from Kabylia to Paris to 
do what he could but, in a context of factional mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, his 
arguments made no impression on Ali Yahia & Co. All of which suggests that the status of 
the Berber language was not a priority for the first wave of Berberists in 1949. 
 
What of the second wave, the class of 1980? At first sight, it would appear that the language 
issue was not merely central to the latter's preoccupations, but that it was their only 
preoccupation. Not only did Berberist demonstrators in 1980 make clear their hostility to the 
government’s Arabisation policy, the movement equally vigorously canvassed the claims of 
the Berber language, Thamazighth. But, as I pointed out at the time, the movement, while 
united in what it opposed, was far from coherent in its positive proposals.30 
 
                                                 
28 Omar Carlier, ‘Nationalisme et identité: la crise "Berbériste" de 1949’, Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord 1984 , 
347-371, reprinted in O. Carlier, Entre Nation et Jihad: histoire sociale des radicalismes algériens, Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1995, pp.240-270. 
29 Hocine Aït Ahmed, Mémoires d’un combattant, Paris: Sylvie Messenger, 1983, pp. 180-181. 
30 Roberts (1980), p.123. 
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Three distinct currents could be identified, I suggested. The first, which I called ‘cultural-
pluralist’, was inclined to accept the government's policy of Arabisation on condition that the 
state also accepted, and made room for, the claims of Berber as a second national language. A 
second current, which I called ‘Amazigh-revivalist’, took a very different view, bitterly 
attacking the ‘cultural-pluralists’ for implicitly dividing the Algerian nation, which it insisted 
was intrinsically and  uniformly Berber31 in origin and character, irrespective of what 
languages were now spoken by its members, while simultaneously opposing the Arabisation 
policy on the grounds that it involved the importation and imposition on all Algerians of an 
alien language (i.e. Middle Eastern Arabic) at the expense of both of the languages native to 
Algeria - colloquial Algerian Arabic and Berber. Neither current had developed any serious 
position in respect of the practical realisation of their demands. In particular, neither had 
addressed the question of how Berber was to be taught or how public administration was to 
function in Berber, and neither had addressed the question of how the differences between the 
various Berber dialects - differences which are quite substantial as well as long-established32 
- might be transcended in a standardised Berber language capable of being taught, learned 
and used across the country.  
 
In contrast to these two tendencies, a third tendency could be identified, I suggested, which, 
instead of promoting the particular claims of Berber in one way or another, was demanding 
something else altogether, namely the democratisation or at least liberalisation of Algerian 
public life. An implication of this demand, however, was that the language issue should cease 
to be an affair of public policy. I accordingly called this position ‘laissez-faire’, and I 
suggested that it was in reality the most radical of the three, since it clearly presupposed not a 
change of policy on the part of the régime, but the end of its dictatorial character and the 
advent of a liberal-democratic constitution and form of government within which cultural 
matters would cease to be the object of authoritarian social engineering. 
 
Culture and democracy, 1980-1989 
While the conflicts between these various points of view can hardly be said to have been 
sorted out in the years after the 1980 upheaval, the third, democratic, tendency seemed to be 
making most headway by the mid-1980s. As government crack-downs on Berberist agitation 
                                                 
31 That is, ‘Amazigh’, the term many Berbers now use to refer to themselves; Amazigh (whence, for the 
language, Thamazighth) literally means ‘free man’, plural: Imazighen. It is only since the advent of the second 
wave of Berberism in the mid- to late 1970s that Berbers have begun to use the terms  Amazigh, Imazighen and 
Thamazighth in this way. Previously, Algerian Berbers invariably referred to themselves merely as Leqbaïl 
(Kabyles), speakers of Thaqbaïlith , or Ishawiyen (Shawiya), speakers of Thashawiyith, etc., and the term 
Imazighen was used only in Morocco, where it refers to the Berbers of the Middle Atlas and the Central and 
Eastern High Atlas, who speak a dialect known locally as Thamazighth, to distinguish them from the Shleuh 
Berbers and the Thashelhith dialect of the Western High Atlas and the Sous. 
32 These dialects are themselves internally diverse; in Algeria the Kabyle dialect - Thaqbaïlith  - is internally 
diversified into the dialect of Greater Kabylia, the dialect of Lesser Kabylia and the dialect of the Chenoua 
massif; see Abderrazak Dourari, ‘Malaises linguistiques et identitaires en Algérie’, Anadi: Revue d’Études 
Amazighes, Tizi Ouzou, Algeria, No. 2 (June 1997), 17-42, page 18. As Dourari also notes, the Tuareg Berbers 
of the central Sahara speak at least four recognisably distinct sub-dialects - Thahaggarth (the dialect of the Kel 
Ahaggar), Thaïrth, the dialect of the Kel Aïr, Thadghaq , the dialect of the Kel Adghagh and Thawllemet, the 
dialect of the Iwllemeden; in addition there are the dialect of the Mzabi Berbers, Thamzabith and that of the 
Oued Righ, Touggourt and Ouargla - Tharighit. Dourari neglects to mention that there are also several distinct 
dialects or sub-dialects of Thashawiyith, the language of the Shawiya (Chaouia) Berbers of the high plains of the 
Sud-Constantinois and the Aurès and Nememcha mountains in south-eastern Algeria, whose Berber speech sub-
divides into the distinct sub-dialects of the Harakta, the Nememcha, the Aït Frah, etc. Indeed, this list probably 
understates the extent of the linguistic fragmentation of Algerian Berbers. 
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yielded successive crops of political prisoners from 1980 onwards, a vigorous human-rights 
agitation developed which began to put the régime and its authoritarian attitudes on the 
defensive, while the régime's monopoly of historical and revolutionary legitimacy was 
challenged by a new movement called the Association of the Children of Martyrs 
(Association des Enfants de Chouhada) - that is, the orphaned children of men and women 
who were killed fighting for Algeria during the war. The point about this association was 
that, in addition to contesting the régime’s monopoly of historic legitimacy, it also breached 
the Party's formal monopoly of public life, and did so flagrantly, thereby setting a dangerous 
precedent, as the authorities certainly realised, since they acted promptly to suppress it.   
 
But these two developments were significant from another point of view. Kabyles were 
prominent in the leadership of both the Association of the Children of Martyrs and the 
fledgling human rights movement. A leading spokesman for the former was Noureddine Aït 
Hamouda, son of the legendary Kabyle guerrilla commander Colonel Amirouche.33 And the 
effective leader of the human rights movement was Abdennour Ali Yahia, a well known 
lawyer who also happened to be of the same family as Rachid Ali Yahia, the leader of the 
class of ’49.34 But, unlike the language and cultural agitations, the agitations conducted by 
these latter movements tended to link Kabyles to non-Kabyles and non-Berbers, whereas the 
specifically linguistic and culturalist agenda of the other movement tended to politicise and 
reinforce the Kabyle-Arab dichotomy and seal up their adepts in a specifically Kabyle 
political ghetto. 
 
It can therefore be seen that two main tendencies were developing in Kabylia throughout the 
1980s. The Berberist tendency, organised in the initially clandestine Berber Cultural 
Movement (Mouvement Culturel Berbère, MCB), was one, and the liberal-democratic 
tendency, organised in particular in Ali Yahia's Algerian League for Human Rights (Ligue 
Algérienne des Droits de l'Homme, LADH), was the other. Despite a degree of overlap 
between the two, the first tended to isolate the Kabyles and bottle them up in a preoccupation 
with their own identity, whereas the second tended to emancipate them from the particularist 
ghetto and enable them to contribute to a broader, potentially nation-wide, challenge to the 
régime on the basis of democratic principles. For, while the authorities cracked down on Ali 
Yahia's organisation, they were obliged to bow to public pressure on the human rights issue 
to the extent of sponsoring a tame, official, League of their own, 35 and, since it would have 
been self-evident nonsense for even this officially-sponsored League to come under the 
supervision of the Party, they allowed it to operate outside the Party's umbrella, thereby 
making the first formal breach in the Party's monopoly of public life, a development which, 
as many people understood at the time, was the thin end of the wedge, as was subsequently 
confirmed by a Law on Associations which further subverted the Party's authority in 1987. 
 
                                                 
33 Amirouche Aït Hamouda (1926-1959), from Tassaft Ouaguemoun in the central Jurjura, was the commander 
of the Armée de Libération Nationale  in wilaya III (Kabylia) from July 1957 until his death in action in March 
1959. He is a national hero. Numerous towns, including Algiers, have streets named after him; a lycée at Tizi 
Ouzou bears his name. 
34 The Ali Yahia family is from Taka, in the Aït Yahia tribe north of Aïn El Hammam in the Jurjura region of 
Greater Kabylia. The fact that Abdennour Ali Yahia is related to Rachid Ali Yahia does not necessarily have 
political significance. Unlike Rachid, Abdennour Ali Yahia was active in the national revolution, notably in the 
leadership of the nationalist trade union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) and served in 
both Ben Bella’s and Boumediène’s governments in the 1960s before falling out with Boumediène in 1967, 
since when he had concentrated on his legal practice in Algiers. 
35 This was led by Miloud Brahimi (brother of the distinguished diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi), and adopted the 
same name as Ali Yahia’s organization, which of course had by then been suppressed. 
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This is how matters stood when the balloon went up in October 1988, when riots on an 
unprecedented scale erupted in Algiers and spread to numerous other towns, in the wake of 
which President Chadli and his colleagues decided to embark on a major programme of 
‘reforms’, chief among which, it transpired in February 1989, was the complete abolition of 
the Party's monopoly with the introduction of a pluralist constitution. 
 
One might have thought that the advent of a pluralist, and potentially liberal, constitution 
would have vindicated the perspectives of the democratic tendency in Kabylia and signaled 
the eclipse - or at least the marginalisation - of the Berberist tendency. This is not what 
happened at all. While the independent human rights movement was able to operate in the 
open at last,36 the main development was that of a new political party, the RCD, led by a 
certain Dr Saïd Sadi, which, as an offshoot primarily of the MCB, came from the Berberist 
rather than the democratic tendency in Kabyle politics, and which, far from enabling the 
Kabyles to join with their fellow-Algerians on the basis of a democratic platform of some 
kind, gave renewed expression to Kabyle particularism and reinforced the Kabyle-Arab 
dichotomy by giving this dichotomy an entirely new content.  
 
This content was secularism. While the RCD took over from the MCB the long-standing 
concern with the Berber language, it added two other concerns which were new: a 
commitment to a modernist and egalitarian attitude to the position of women in Algerian 
society, and a commitment to what it called ‘la laïcité’, by which it meant, as Dr Sadi 
repeatedly made clear, the principle of the separation of religion from politics. While it 
formally gave equal billing to each of these three planks in its platform (Berber language, 
women’s rights, secularism), it unquestionably tended to give priority to the third (and to treat 
the second as ancillary to the third). The RCD's spokesman who announced the party's 
formation in February 1989 had defined its purpose as “to bar the road to theocratic 
ambitions” (“barrer la route aux velléités théocratiques”),37 and it very soon became clear 
that the principal purpose of the RCD was to resist and oppose the Islamist movement in 
Algeria. The language issue had clearly been superseded by other preoccupations. 
 
Formally, it might be argued, the RCD was not so much a continuation of the Berberist 
movement as its gravedigger. It combined in its name - Rally for Culture and Democracy - 
the central ideas of both tendencies in Kabyle politics, in both of which, moreover, its leader, 
Dr Sadi, had been personally prominent,38 but it might be thought to have given priority to 
the second of these, and certainly its activity entirely marginalised the MCB from which it 
sprang. It might thus be considered to have been the negation of Berberism within Berberism, 
or at least the negation of Berberism at the point of exit from Berberism. But this view of the 
matter only holds good if Berberism is defined in terms of a primary preoccupation with the 
status of the Berber language.  
 
There were certainly many people in the MCB who were in earnest about the language issue, 
and these activists were mostly opposed to the formation of the RCD, on the grounds that the 
language issue should be canvassed with all parties, and that supporters of Berber language 
rights should not alienate potential support in the various political parties by posing an 
                                                 
36 Although Ali Yahia was finally allowed to conduct his human rights activities within the law, he was obliged 
to rename his organization the Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme , LADDH, since the 
original name continued to be retained by its state-sponsored rival 
37 ‘Des berbéristes ont formé un embryon de parti légal’, Le Monde, February 15, 1989. 
38 Sadi was a founder member of both the MCB and the original LADH. 
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electoral threat to any of them.39 But the point is that this wholly cogent objection was easily 
brushed aside. The RCD was set up, and virtually all of its leadership and cadres came out of 
the MCB, and most of the element of Kabyle opinion which had previously followed the mots 
d'ordre of the MCB made the transition to following the mots d'ordre of the RCD without the 
slightest difficulty, despite the fact that the mots d'ordre had changed. And when the rump of 
the MCB, led precisely by those who had opposed the formation of the RCD, tried to keep 
their movement going by organizing a demonstration on the language issue in Algiers in 
January 1990, the RCD leadership vigorously opposed the demonstration and tried to 
sabotage it.40 (By the time the MCB was revived in 1991, it had been taken over by the RCD 
and was led by RCD activists and functioned as a docile satellite of the party, in sharp 
contrast to its earlier robust independence of political connections.) Thus the language issue 
had never been the principal preoccupation of the majority of the second wave of Kabyle 
Berberists any more than it had been the principal preoccupation of the first wave.  
 
One might also argue that, in making secularism its principal plank, the RCD was 
endeavouring to escape from the ghetto of Kabyle particularism, and was taking up an issue 
on which it could hope to elicit support across the country. But, if the founders of the RCD 
originally entertained such expectations, their illusory nature should have been brought home 
to them by the results of the municipal and regional elections in June 1990; for, while RCD 
candidates polled moderately well in Kabylia,41 they failed dismally everywhere else.42 These 
elections established what should have been known well in advance, that an explicitly 
secularist position could not hope to win significant popular support outside Kabylia, and that 
for the RCD to adopt this position was in fact to condemn itself to being just another 
expression of Kabyle particularism in the eyes of the greater part of Algerian public opinion. 
That a concern to escape from the Kabyle ghetto was not a priority for the RCD's leaders was 
made clear by their persistence with secularist positions after June 1990. 
 
Thus the RCD was not a negation of Kabyle Berberism at all, merely a mutation of it. With 
the RCD, Berberism became a distinct political party operating openly and within the law, 
and redefined its purpose in terms, not of the language issue, but of the religious issue. In 
claiming to represent Kabyle opinion, and in taking its stand on the question of la laïcité, the 
RCD identified the Kabyles with secularism. And it thereby gave the Kabyle-Arab dichotomy 
in Algerian political history a new lease of life, and a new and virulent content. 
 
In doing this, the RCD was arguably acting against the formal spirit of the constitution. 43 But, 
since the Chadli régime nevertheless decided to legalise the RCD when it could have chosen 
                                                 
39 Salem Mezhoud: ‘Glasnost the Algerian way: the role of Berber nationalists in political reform’, in George 
Joffé, ed., North Africa: Nation, State and Region, London: Routledge, 1993, p.162. This article, based on a 
conference paper given in 1989, testifies most eloquently to the democratic aspirations which motivated many 
Kabyle Berberists and the illusions they entertained in respect of the democratic potential of the identity-centred 
agitation which mobilised them. 
40 Alain Mahé, Histoire de la Grande Kabylie XIX-XX siècles: anthopologie historique du lien social dans les 
communautés villageoises, Algiers: Éditions Bouchène, 2001, p.499. 
41 Notably in taking control of 31 out of the 52 municipalities in the wilaya of Bejaia and 44 of the 66 
municipalities in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou; it did so, however, on the basis of a majority share of a very low 
turnout, and thus effectively won by default. 
42 While picking up a few stray municipal council (Assemblée Populaire Communale, APC) seats here and 
there, the RCD won control of only one APC outside the Kabylia region (Bouzina, in the Aurès). 
43 Article 40 of the 1989 constitution recognized the right to form “associations of a political character”, which 
was promptly interpreted to mean political parties, but had then stipulated that “This right, nonetheless, cannot 
be invoked in order to undermine fundamental freedoms, national unity, the integrity of the territory, the 
independence of the country or the sovereignty of the people” (see El Moudjahid, February 5, 1989, which 
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not to, the RCD cannot be said to have acted against the purpose of the constitution. It was 
for the author of the constitution to decide what its purpose was, after all, and the author of 
the constitution was the Chadli régime. And in legalising the RCD, the Chadli régime was 
demonstrating to those with eyes to see that the democratisation of the Algerian state was not 
among its purposes. 
 
The RCD and democracy, part I 
The existence of the RCD as a legal political party was conditional on the existence of the 
pluralist constitution of 1989. One might have thought that it would have recognised its 
interest in the preservation of this constitution, and confined its democratic ambitions to this 
end, supplemented perhaps by the canvassing of further specific reforms such as would tend 
to consolidate the great formal change that had occurred with the advent of pluralism and, by 
thus ensuring that this change was a matter of political substance rather than merely 
constitutional form, make it irreversible. Such reforms might have included enhanced powers 
for the legislature, the independence of the judiciary, legal guarantees of press freedom, 
freedom of information, the freedom to organise independent trade unions, freedoms of 
various other kinds in the economic sphere, institutions to protect human rights and civil 
liberties (e.g. an Ombudsman, specialist tribunals and courts of appeal, etc.), and so on and so 
forth. A party which put forward proposals of this kind and campaigned energetically for 
them would have lived up to its ‘Democratic’ name. But the RCD did not do any of this. 
What it did was to call for ‘la laïcité d'État’, that is the abolition of Islam's status as the 
official religion of the state. 
 
By doing this, and making this its central proposal and the basis of its appeal to the electorate, 
the RCD charted a course which tended to subvert the 1989 pluralist constitution instead of 
consolidating it. Instead of taking this constitution as the ground for subsequent development, 
it immediately made an issue of this constitution on the grounds that it was not a secular 
constitution. This behaviour had several profound effects. 
 
First, it galvanised the Islamists into forming a party of their own. The RCD was not set up in 
reaction to the FIS, it was set up before the FIS had been founded. It was the FIS which was 
set up in reaction to the RCD. 44 While it is entirely possible that Algeria's diffuse Islamist 
movement would have crystallised into a unified political party anyway, it remains the case 
that it did so only after the RCD had announced its programme and purpose, and that it did so 
very soon after, and in reaction to, this event. 
 
Second, it helped ensure that the newly established party-political sphere was ideologically 
polarised from the outset between the FIS and itself, that is between parties canvassing 
alternative, extremely doctrinaire, conceptions of the constitution, both of which (‘dawla 
islamiyya’, ‘la laïcité d'État’) were radical alternatives to, and therefore by implication 
subversive of, the actual constitution. It thereby helped to ensure that political debate 
thereafter would focus on rival constitutiona l proposals, and moreover proposals of a far-
fetched if not utopian nature, instead of rival programmes for government, and that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
published the full text of the draft constitutional revisions). In so far as the RCD was politicising the Kabyle -
Arab dichotomy, it was certainly open to the reproach that it was undermining national unity. 
44 The creation of the FIS was formally announced in Algiers on March 9, 1989; the decision to found the party 
had been taken earlier and was informally announced on February 21, 1989 (Le Monde, February 23, 1989); the 
formation of the RCD had already been announced on February 11 (see note 37 above), having occurred the 
previous day. 
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climate in which these proposals would be discussed would be one of mounting hysteria and 
incipient violence.  
 
Third, in addition to identifying the Kabyles with secularism, the RCD ensured that both the 
cause of democracy and, more modestly, opposition to the Islamist agenda of the FIS would 
be split along secularist/non-secularist lines. There is no doubt whatever that a majority of 
Algerians, while self-consciously Muslim and even devout, were resistant to the Islamists’ 
appeal at first. Were the democratic priority of priorities, as the RCD defined it, “to bar the 
road to theocratic ambitions” (i.e. no pasarán!), then it followed that the thing to do was to 
preserve and maximise the unity of non-Islamists in Algerian politics. This could only have 
been done on the basis of defence of the existing constitution, including its provision that 
Islam was the state religion, a provision which had been in place since 1963 and had never 
connoted the subjection of the population to theocratic government, for the excellent reason 
that what it had really implied was the subordination of Algeria’s religious leaders to the 
nation-state (as many Islamists bitterly complained), and thus the curbing of religious 
enthusiasm in the political sphere. To argue for the dis-establishment of religion was to split 
the non-Islamist majority, and to identify not only democracy but all opposition to the  
Islamists with secularism. And since Islam has always been an intensely public religion, to 
identify democracy or any kind of resistance to Islamism with secularism, namely the 
proposal that religious belief and observance should be reduced to a strictly private matter, 
that is, should be expelled from the public sphere, was to identify these things with a 
conception of the Islamic religion which many if not most self-respecting Muslims, and not 
merely radical Islamists, would be naturally disposed to cons ider as un-Islamic. In short, the 
RCD's position tended to identify both democracy and any and all resistance to the Islamists 
with unbelief, and thereby provided enormous support to the FIS's own position that 
democracy is kufr (infidel) 45 and that all sincere Muslims should support the Islamist agenda. 
And it did all this while simultaneously proposing that the state should disarm itself in the 
face of the Islamist challenge by abandoning its constitutional authority in the religious 
sphere. 
 
Political parties accused of behaving in the face of the fascist enemy in Spain as the RCD 
behaved in the face of the Islamist enemy in Algeria were suppressed by the Republican 
government. But the Chadli régime did not suppress the RCD, it bent over backwards to 
facilitate it. While the draft Law on Political Associations submitted to the FLN-controlled 
National Assembly in July 1989 originally stipulated that parties based on an ethnic, regional 
or linguistic interests would not be allowed, this stipulation was promptly nullified by an 
amendment inserting the single word “exclusively” before these terms. As a result, the 
government was free to legalise the RCD, on the grounds that, although indisputably based 
on regional and linguistic (if not also ethnic) interests, it was not based “exclusively” on 
these. And having thus gone out of its way to legalise the RCD, the government saw to it that 
the state-controlled media thereafter gave every facility to its leaders to air their views. 
 
The first manipulation 
It should now be clear what the initial manipulation of Berberism amounted to. I have already 
described elsewhere the way in which the Chadli régime deliberately manipulated the 
                                                 
45 See – as one illustration among many - the excerpt from one of the sermons of the FIS No. 2, Sheikh Ali Ben 
Hadj, published in L’Express, February 9, 1990. 
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Islamist movement in Algeria both in 1980-1982 and from 1989 onwards.46  I have also 
explained what the motives of Chadli & Co. were in undertaking this audacious manoeuvre, 
how they sought to ensure that the FIS humiliated the FLN in June 1990 in order to be able to 
exploit this defeat as a pretext for purging the FLN of powerful factions opposed to the 
Chadli leadership, and thereafter convert the party into ‘un parti présidentiel’ under firm 
Chadlist control, which would be discreetly helped to win the elections which really 
mattered, those for the National Assembly, when these were finally he ld in 1991. I have also 
explained how and why Chadli's enemies were able to turn the tables on him, and convert the 
FIS from an instrument of Chadli's strategy to an instrument of their own, and how this 
fatally disrupted Chadli's strategy and finally brought him down. 47 
 
It is in this context that we can understand why the Chadli régime deliberately connived at the 
formation of the RCD: it did so precisely because it counted on the RCD subsequently 
behaving as it did, because this was grist to the mill of its wider strategy of manipulating the 
Islamists. 
 
It should already be clear in what way the activity and propaganda of the RCD was a gift to 
the FIS. But, while the reinforcement of the FIS, on the rebound, so to speak, was the main 
function of the RCD in the Chadlist strategy, the RCD performed at least two other functions. 
First, the RCD split the Kabyle electorate.  
 
So far I have spoken of Berberism, and of the RCD mutation of Berberism, as if this was the 
only tendency within Kabyle politics. This is, of course, very far from being the case. 
Berberism was an affair of a small minority in Kabyle political circles in 1949, when the 
PPA-MTLD leaders had no difficult in enlisting the services of Kabyle loyalists to suppress 
the Berberist dissidence. But Berberism was also a minority trend in Kabyle politics in the 
late 1980s. The FLN was present in Kabylia, for a start, and while much reduced in influence 
by 1989, it still managed to carry 16 APCs in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou in 1990 and 17 APCs 
in neighbouring Bejaia.48 But more important than the FLN was a movement called the 
Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS). 
 
The FFS was a far older party than the RCD, having been founded in 1963. Its leader, Hocine 
Aït Ahmed (born 1926), is widely recognised as having been a founder-member (one of the 
so-called 'nine historic chiefs') of the FLN in 1954, but he fell out with Ahmed Ben Bella at 
independence, and organised an armed uprising in Kabylia in September 1963 which lasted 
till June 1965. Aït Ahmed himself was captured in Kabylia in October 1964, sentenced to 
death, reprieved, sentenced to life imprisonment instead, and finally escaped into exile in 
1966, where he remained until his party was legalised in 1989. 
 
Aït Ahmed was far from being a Berberist. A leader of the younger generation of nationalist 
activists in Kabylia after 1945, he was elected to the PPA-MTLD Central Committee at the 
age of 21 in 1947 and was chosen to command the PPA's clandestine para-military 
                                                 
46 Hugh Roberts, ‘From radical ambition to equivocal ambition: the expansion and manipulation of Algerian 
Islamism, 1979-1992’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 
IV: Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences/University of Chicago Press, 1994a, pp.428-488. 
47 Roberts (1994a). 
48 For the detailed results of the 1990 APC elections, see El Moudjahid June 18, 19, 22-23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, 
1990. 
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Organisation Spéciale (OS) in 1948.49 As such, he viewed the Berberist agitation developed 
by Rachid Ali Yahia with horror, and it was he who asked Mohand Amokrane Khelifati to go 
to Paris to try to reason with Ali Yahia before things got out of hand.50 He got no credit for 
this with the PPA leadership, however, and was one of the principal victims of the affair, 
since he was removed from the command of the OS in its wake, the PPA leader Messali Hadj 
later admitting that "on a éliminé sans discernement des éléments gênants en les taxant de 
berbéristes" .51 
 
The challenge he launched to Ben Bella in the 1963 revolt was not Berberist in character. 
Although the FFS found support primarily in Kabylia, it also had support amongst 
Arabophone Algerians in the Algérois, the Nord-Constantinois and the Sud-Oranais,52 and in 
order to maximise the chances of securing this support, Aït Ahmed ensured that the FFS 
abstained from raising any demands of a Kabyle-particularist nature.53 The basis of the FFS’s 
opposition to Ben Bella was its objection to the régime’s incipient authoritarianism, which 
had been made evident by its reduction of the National Assembly (in which Aït Ahmed sat) 
to a mere rubber stamp of the Party. The FFS appealed for a return to what Aït Ahmed 
(somewhat fancifully) portrayed as the ‘democratic’ traditions of the wartime FLN, and in 
particular called for a congress of the FLN to be held,54 but took care not to engage in overt 
Berberist agitation of any kind. 
 
Between 1966 and 1980, Aït Ahmed kept the FFS in being as an opposition move ment based 
in exile, with an extensive network amongst Kabyle labour migrants in France, but with an 
underground network in Kabylia as well. By 1978, aware of the development of Berberist 
sentiments among the younger generation in Kabylia, the FFS had formally taken up the 
language claim as a matter of democratic principle. Although it did not start the agitation in 
Kabylia in 1980, it tried to provide political leadership to the movement. The key FFS 
representative in Kabylia in 1980 was none other than Saïd Sadi.55 
 
It is not clear precisely when Sadi decided his own future lay outside Aït Ahmed's FFS, but 
he had certainly broken with the FFS long before 1989.56 As a much younger man (born 
1947), with an impressive record of activism behind him, a leading position in the MCB and 
something of a martyr's halo from a spell in jail in the 1980s, Sadi could expect to appeal to 
the younger generation of Kabyles for whom the FFS of yesteryear meant little or nothing. 
 
From the point of view of the Chadli régime, however, there can be no doubt that it was Aït 
Ahmed who represented the real threat.  As a former commander of the OS, a founder-
                                                 
49 Although discovered and dismantled by the French in 1950, the OS was partially reconstituted in 1953 and 
was the source of all the activists who took part in the creation of the FLN in 1954. Its historic role as forerunner 
of the FLN is universally recognised in Algeria. 
50 Aït Ahmed (1983), p.180. 
51 Mohamed Harbi, Aux Origines du FLN: le populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie , Paris: Christian Bourgois, 
1975, pp. 38-39. 
52 The FFS rebellion was supported by former maquisards led by Lakhdar Bouregaa in the Algérois, Moussa 
Hassani in the Nord-Constantinois and Mohamed Ben Ahmed (alias Si Moussa) in the Sud-Oranais. 
53 As some of his followers bitterly complained; see Mohamed Arab Bessaoud, Le FFS: Espoir et Trahison, 
Paris: Imprimérie Cary, 1966. 
54 See Hocine Ait Ahmed, La Guerre et l’Après-Guerre, Paris  : Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1964, especially 
pp.165-204. 
55 Saïd Sadi, Algérie, L’Heure de Vérité, Paris  : Flammarion, 1996, p.89. 
56 Sadi (1996), pp. 125-126, appears to situate this in 1982, but his account is less than wholly explicit or 
precise; in an official six-page biography of Sadi posted on the RCD’s internet web-site, the parting of the ways 
is situated in "début 1982" (www.rcd.asso.fr). 
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member of the original FLN and a pioneer of the opposition to the régime in Algiers since 
independence, Aït Ahmed possessed a degree of both historic nationalist and democratic 
legitimacy which made him potentially a formidable proposition, someone potentially 
capable of galvanising and orchestrating a nation-wide democratic movement in conditions of 
political pluralism, given the discredit of the FLN and the scepticism with which most 
Algerians were initially disposed to view the Islamists. If Aït Ahmed had a free hand in his 
native Kabylia and were able as a result to take his Kabyle support base for granted, as a 
nationalist with an excellent command of the Arabic language and no Berberist tag to live 
down, he could hope to win significant support in other parts of the country and fatally 
disrupt Chadli's general strategy. To protect this strategy, it was vital to cause problems for 
Aït Ahmed in Kabylia, by encouraging a rival political force which, by threatening to deprive 
the FFS of an audience in Kabyle youth, would force Aït Ahmed to invest in Berberist 
themes in order to defend his home base and thereby compromise his prospects of appealing 
to non-Kabyles on a non-Berberist basis. 
 
The promotion of Saïd Sadi’s RCD was thus in Chadli's immediate interest in two respects: 
first, as a red rag to the Islamist bull and a source of secularist propaganda which played into 
the FIS’s hands and, second, as a means of dividing the Kabyle electorate and thwarting Aït 
Ahmed’s ambitions. That Aït Ahmed understood this is suggested by his decision not to 
contest the 1990 municipal and regional elections, allowing the RCD a free run in Kabylia 
against the FLN, and keeping his powder dry. While his decision was widely criticised on the 
grounds that the FFS boycott materially assisted the FIS in 1990, this criticism was entirely 
misguided, since the FIS was not contesting most of the Kabyle constituencies in any case, 
and the FFS's call for a boycott was certainly heeded in Kabylia as the turn-out in Tizi Ouzou 
(22.82 per cent) and Bejaia (27.0 per cent) indicated.57 
 
The second additional function which the RCD performed was to provide rhetorical comfort 
for Chadli's position.  
 
As I have explained elsewhere, a crucial aspect of Chadli's strategy was to deflect public 
criticism of the régime from his own performance (and that of his allies and cronies) on to the 
far broader and more abstract target of ‘the FLN’, and I have also explained how the FIS’s 
propaganda suited Chadli's purposes admirably in this respect.58  By denouncing “the thieves 
of the FLN” in general, and counterposing the allegedly corrupt and Godless FLN in power 
since 1962 to the allegedly devout and virtuous (because properly Muslim) FLN of the 
revolutionary war, the FIS was able both to posture as the legitimate heir of the wartime FLN 
and to serve Chadli’s purposes by shielding him from personal criticism. The essential thing 
was to ensure that public opinion did not contrast the dismal and disappointing years of 
Chadli & Co. with the more successful and inspiring years of the Boumediène era. The FIS, 
which had no time for Boumediène, was happy to oblige.  
 
What needs to be added is simply that the discourse of the RCD dovetailed perfectly with that 
of the FIS in this respect. “Trente ans de dérive” (“Thirty years of going off the rails”) 
became a staple theme of Saïd Sadi's speeches, the argument being that, while the national 
revolution was, of course, a good thing, everything had gone wrong since Independence (just 
                                                 
57 Source: see note 48 above; the success of the boycott call was obviously, to a considerable extent, a measure 
of the FFS’s potential electoral strength. 
58 Hugh Roberts, ‘Doctrinaire economics and political opportunism in the strategy of Algerian Islamism’ in John 
Ruedy (ed.), Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University, Washington D.C., New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994b, p.139. 
 21
as the Islamists said), but for the opposite reason, namely the decision to make Islam the 
official religion of the state, with all that this supposedly entailed.  
 
From Chadli’s point of view, of course, it was all one: the problem with the Algerian state 
was systemic, it was not his fault in the least, and he and his allies and associates were not in 
the dock; on one count or another (for being insufficiently Islamic or excessively so) ‘the 
FLN’ was - whatever this acronym was understood to refer to exactly - and if public opinion 
was at sixes and sevens as to precisely why ‘the FLN’ was to be faulted, so much the better. 
 
The RCD and democracy, part II, or the second manipulation 
By late 1991, however, the boot was on the other foot with a vengeance, and the results of the 
legislative elections, when these were finally held on December 26, were a comprehensive 
disaster for Chadli and his allies. Not only had the FIS won so handsomely on the first round 
that it was heading for a final tally of 75 per cent of the National Assembly seats, a result that 
would be used by the army as a pretext for Chadli’s enforced resignation, in addition the 
RCD had been trounced in Kabylia. 
 
By the time the elections were held, Aït Ahmed’s FFS had had time to get its act together and 
overhaul the RCD, and in the election results it massively outdistanced its rival, polling some 
500,000 votes to the RCD’s 200,000 and winning all 25 seats decided on the first ballot in the 
Kabylia region, 59 while the FLN, despite its far larger vote nation-wide, secured only 16 seats 
on the first ballot. While the numerous awkward implications of the FIS’s huge first-round 
lead were no doubt the main factor behind the army’s decision to force Chadli to step down 
and to cancel the second round of the election scheduled for January 16, the prospect of Aït 
Ahmed emerging at last as the champion and chief rallying point for anti-Islamist opinion 
was also intolerable to it. 
 
By cancelling the elections, the army thus killed (at least) two birds with one stone, and this 
development was, of course, extremely congenial to the RCD, which had nothing left to hope 
for from the continuation of the electoral process. The RCD accordingly threw itself behind 
the army, and devoted its energies to justifying the interruption of the democratic process in 
the name of democracy, a service which was naturally appreciated by the army commanders, 
while Aït Ahmed’s FFS was forced into the position of denouncing the army’s move as a 
coup, and contracting an alliance with both the FIS and the FLN, in defence of the democratic 
process. These alignments were to remain broadly in force for the next seven years, with the 
RCD providing consistent support, in the name of secularist and democratic principles, first 
to the cancellation of the elections, next to the dissolution of the FIS, and finally to the 
military campaign to ‘eradicate’ the Islamist rebellion which the decision to dissolve the FIS 
had inevitably provoked. In this way, the army was able to secure badly needed legitimation 
from the Berberist tendency in Kabylia, while simultaneously benefiting from the disarray in 
democratic ranks and the way in which the ‘democratic’ cause, by becoming identified with 
militarist repression, tended to discredit itself with all other sectors of Algerian opinion, 
                                                 
59 The FFS won 12 seats in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, 11 in Bejaia, one in Bouïra and one in Setif; in addition, 
FFS candidates were in first place on the second ballot in four constituencies (one each in the wilayât of Tizi 
Ouzou, Bouïra, Boumerdès and Setif) and in second place in a further 15 constituencies in seven different 
wilayât: Algiers (5), Bouïra (1), Boumerdès (3), Setif (1), Tindouf (1), Tipasa (1) and Tizi Ouzou (3); it had thus 
achieved an appreciable measure of success in eight wilayât in all. In contrast, the RCD won no seats at all, was 
in first place in only three constituencies, all in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, and in second place in two further 
constituencies, in Tizi Ouzou and Bouïra respectively; it had thus achieved a very mediocre measure of success 
in only two wilayât. 
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leaving the military régime to appear to many observers as the only convincing alternative to 
the armed Islamist movements, and vice versa. 
 
The bitter irony in this turn of events should be self-evident. But, in case it isn’t, consider the 
following. One of the three RCD candidates to get through to the second round in the wilaya 
of Tizi Ouzou in 1991 was the singer Ferhat Mehenni, who represented the RCD in the 
constituency of Bouzeguen. Mehenni, popularly known simply by his first name Ferhat, is a 
well-known figure in contemporary Kabyle music. By 1991 he had also emerged as the new 
secretary of the MCB, reflecting the RCD’s take-over of the movement (before this 
subsequently split along party lines into the MCB-Coordination Nationale, controlled by the 
RCD, and the MCB-Commissions Nationales, controlled by the FFS). As a singer in the early 
1980s he had helped raise Berberist consciousness in numerous polemical songs. One of the 
most popular was called ‘Berzidan’, an Algerian corruption of the French word Président; the 
song was an extremely sarcastic address to President Chadli (then busy putting Berberist 
activists in jail, where Ferhat himself joined them at one point in the mid-1980s). In French 
translation its opening lines, sung with heavy irony, are “Le bonjour à Monsieur le Président, 
et au Pouvoir Militaire.”60 Less than a decade later Ferhat and his party were on the same 
side as ‘le Pouvoir militaire’ and opposed to the continuation of the democratic process, and 
the extension of democratic rights to Islamists, in the name of democracy, and apparently not 
so disposed to ironise about things any longer.61 
 
The French connection 
Berberism as an organised political force is not primarily the expression of a will to defend 
and enhance the Berber element of Algerian culture or even of Kabyle culture. In the 
linguistic sphere, the Berber element of Algerian culture exists in a number of distinct 
dialects with their own linguistic forms and histories, as we have seen; it follows that the 
ambition to unify and standardise the Berber language in Algeria, supposing the Berberists 
themselves are in earnest about this, which remains to be demonstrated, would not be to the 
advantage of the Berber dialects which people actually speak, but at their expense. In reality, 
Berberist agitation on the language issue has done much more to impede the advance of 
Arabisation than to enhance the status of Berber, and in doing this it has, of course, worked to 
the advantage of the one written language that most Kabyles actually command, French. 
In the political sphere, the demand for ‘la laïcité d'État’ does not express a Berber tradition. 
All Berber political traditions have taken the public aspect and status of the Islamic faith for 
granted. Secularism, the radical separation of religion from politics, is not a Berber idea, it is 
a French idea. But it was not only when the Berberists took up secularism that they began to 
vehicle French political ideas, they have always done so.  
 
The conception canvassed by Rachid Ali Yahia & Co. in 1949, l'Algérie algérienne, was a 
French conception. It is in France above all that the idea of the nation has been a political 
rather than a cultural idea, the idea of the democratic political community of free citizens 
whose status is independent of religious belief and other particular cultural stigmata, and who 
                                                 
60 In Thaqbaïlith, these lines are: "Sbah l -khir i Berzidan/Win na ihekman S waaskeri" 
61 At some point in 1994 or 1995, Ferhat broke with the RCD and the RCD-controlled wing of the MCB and, 
having tried without success to constitute a distinct version of the MCB detached from both the RCD and the 
FFS, appears subsequently to have lapsed into political inactivity. He has recently re-emerged as an advocate of 
autonomy for Kabylia, a proposition which is currently arousing some controversy but appears to enjoy very 
little support in Kabylia, as opposed to the Kabyle community in France, where it is making some headway (see 
below, note 80). 
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are French in virtue of their citizenship of the Republic rather than citizens in virtue of their 
French culture. The point about l'Algérie algérienne is that it was a notion entirely lacking in 
cultural content; it was thus an Algerian echo or imitation of the French conception of the 
nation.  
 
But Algerian nationalism could not afford to base itself on French conceptions if it was to 
mobilise the Algerian people, let alone secure allies further afield. And the French conception 
it was actually confronting was not the French conception of France, but the French 
conception of Algeria. In the colonial context, the French conception of Algeria was an 
entirely cultural, if not tacitly racial, conception - l'Algérie française - in which the political 
community did not include all and sundry on the basis of the principles of liberté, égalité et 
fraternité, but precisely excluded the Muslim population and penalised the Arab language. To 
posit ‘Algerian Algeria’ was to indulge in a pedantic imitation of a French conception (the 
French conception of France) while evading the real issue. And, mutatis mutandis, that is 
exactly what the second wave of Berberists, having mutated into the RCD, have done since 
1989, indulging in French- inspired phrase-mongering in defiance of Algerian political 
realities. 
 
It can therefore be seen that, far from the expression of Berber cultural identity, political 
Berberism in Algeria is primarily the expression of the French element of the Kabyle 
worldview and identity as these have developed through contact with French culture in the 
colonial context from 1830 (and essentially from 1914), and in the post-colonial context since 
1962, and articulates a fixed idea that there can be no alternative to French models of political 
modernity (other models - including Western ones - of political modernity being 
systematically ignored), a fixed idea which, by vehicling and reproducing the master-pupil 
relationship, betrays the persistence of a colonial inferiority complex. 62  
 
It is this – its true nature – which explains why it was possible for the RCD to agree to join 
the coalition of parties supporting the Bouteflika presidency in July 1999. It is not only that 
Bouteflika was widely perceived, with reason, as enjoying the sponsorship of certain 
powerful generals (especially Larbi Belkheir and Khaled Nezzar), who were publicly 
identified with the Francophile outlook and with whom the RCD leaders had long been on 
intimate terms, and who may reasonably be supposed to have prompted the RCD to make this 
move.63 It was also because it came naturally to the RCD leaders to give precedence to the 
modernist political element of their notional project over its particularist cultural elements. 
The decision to support Bouteflika was rationalised on the grounds that Bouteflika himself 
was committed to a number of modernising reforms (of the education and justice systems, for 
                                                 
62 A tendency to invoke other Western models – notably Spain and the Catalan example – has recently become 
perceptible in the RCD’s discourse, but this is limited by the imperative of adhering to the French conception of 
the secular state; the refusal of Algerian Berberism to consider the experiences of Western countries where the 
development of democracy has not required a prior radical separation of the religious and political fields (e.g. 
the United Kingdom and the Iris h Republic), experiences which might be thought to be more relevant to 
Algerian circumstances, has been total. 
63 The principal sponsor of Bouteflika’s candidacy in 1998-1999 was retired Major General Larbi Belkheir; 
subsequently, retired Major General Khaled Nezzar also announced his support for Bouteflika. Between them 
they were able to mobilize powerful networks of influence across the country as well as abroad, especially in 
France. Both Belkheir and Nezzar belong to the coterie of former officers of the French army who rallied to the 
FLN in the second half of the war of liberation, and who maintained privileged relations with the French 
political and military establishments after 1962. As interior minister and defence minister respectively, Belkheir 
and Nezzar had been the key decision-makers in the events of January-March 1992 – the deposing of Chadli, the 
canceling of the second round of the legislative elections and the dissolution of the FIS – with the RCD’s 
enthusiastic support.  
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instance) and deserved support as such, and that if he was nonetheless obliged to accept the 
support of other political parties whose discourse was inconsistent with this commitment 
(notably the legal Islamist parties, Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah’s MSP and Lahbib Adami’s En-
Nahda), this was all the more reason for the RCD to put its shoulder to the wheel to counter 
their influence in government.  
 
At the same time, the true nature of Kabyle Berberism explains why it has not only tended to 
repel rather than attract the sympathy of Algeria’s other Berber-speakers, but also has never 
risen above the status of a minority trend within Kabylia itself. 
 
Claim and denial 
Berberism is a form of politics which invest the energies of its activists in the business of 
making claims and demands and expressing grievances and resentment. Two of the key 
French terms in its vocabulary are revendication and déni. The Berberist movement asserts la 
revendication amazighe (the Berber claim) and expresses resentment at le déni identitaire, 
the state’s denial of the Amazigh identity. 
 
This denial is a myth. The Algerian state does not deny the Amazigh aspect of Algeria’s 
identity, it recognizes it and is accommodating it. Nor does it deny the particular identity of 
the Kabyles, or practise any substantive discrimination against them or other Algerian 
Berbers.64 In 1973, in the supposedly bad old days of the Boumediène era, one of the 
régime’s leading ideologues in cultural matters and the intellectual champion of Arabo-
Muslim orthodoxy, Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi,65 published in Algeria a book (in French) 
which acknowledged the Berber element of the Algerian people,66 and since then successive 
régimes have gone further and further along the road of formally recognizing le fait berbère. 
As early as 1981, President Chadli spoke publicly of the Imazighen who were the ancestors 
from whom most Algerians were descended; in 1990, an Institute of Amazigh Studies was 
established at Tizi Ouzou university; in 1995 the Zeroua l régime agreed to set up a High 
Berber Commissariat (Haut Commissariat à l’Amazighité, HCA), chaired by a distinguished 
Kabyle intellectual, Mohand Idir Aït Amrane,67 to examine the question of the development 
                                                 
64 To be a Kabyle has in itself been no bar to public office in Algeria since 1962, quite the contrary; Kabyles 
have been a massive presence in the civil service and in the management of both the state as well as private 
sectors of the economy; numerous government ministers have been Kabyles, five of Algeria’s twelve prime 
ministers to date have been Kabyles, the first President of the Council of the Nation was a Kabyle, the leader of 
the main government-sponsored party, the RND, is a Kabyle, there are numerous Kabyle generals and major 
generals in the armed forces (including the current commanders of several military regions) and Kabyles have 
tended to dominate in particular the enormously powerful intelligence services. The ability of Algerian 
nationalism to accommodate a high level of Berber, and especially Kabyle, participation in Algerian 
government and political life was recorded a long time ago by William Quandt in his article, ‘The Berbers in the 
Algerian political élite’, in Gellner & Micaud (1972), pp.285-303. 
65 The son of Sheikh Bachir el-Ibrahimi, who led the Association of Algerian ‘ulama from 1940 to 1965, and 
himself an FLN activist during the war, Taleb Ibrahimi was a permanent fixture in the Algerian government 
from 1965 to 1988 as minister of national education (1965-1970), information and culture (1970-1977), 
minister-adviser to the president (1977-1982) and minister of foreign affairs (1982-1988). 
66 Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, De la Décolonisation à la Révolution culturelle, Algiers: Société Nationale d’Édition 
et de Diffusion, 1973. 
67 Aït Amrane is one of the Kabylia’s most celebrated figures, since it was who, when a student in Algiers in 
1945, composed the famous nationalist song, ‘Kker a mmis u Mazigh’ (‘Stand up, son of Amazigh’), which 
provided Algerian nationalists of Berber origin with a kind of unofficial national anthem in the years leading up 
to the war of liberation. That the régime should have chosen  Aït Amrane to head the HCA testifies to its 
capacity to display consideration for Kabyle (and more broadly Amazigh) sensitivities and to reconcile these 
with Algerian nationalist principles when it chooses. 
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of Thamazighth, and in 1996 the revised constitution ratified on November 28 explicitly 
consecrated l’Amazighité alongside l’Islamité and l’Arabité as one of the three fundamental 
components of Algeria’s national identity. 68 Moreover, it should be noted that news bulletins 
in Thamazighth are broadcast nightly by the state television channel, and that this has been 
the case for the last decade.  In addition, the current régime of President Bouteflika has made 
a point of honouring a significant number of historic Berber figures: thus the airports at 
Bejaia and Hassi Messaoud were renamed in 1999 after Abane Ramdane and Krim Belkacem 
(two leading Kabyle members of the wartime FLN), while in 2000 public buildings in 
Constantine and El Khroub in eastern Algeria were named after Massinissa and Lalla Fatma 
n’Sumer (the heroine of Kabyle resistance to the French conquest in 1857), and an Air-
Algérie Boeing 737-800 was baptised Yougourta (i.e. Jugurtha).69 And numerous schools, 
colleges, hospitals and barracks, not to mention streets and squares (etc.), in Algeria’s cities 
and towns have been named after Kabyle and other Berber figures since the 1960s. 
 
Whether or not such measures are sufficient is, of course, a matter of opinion. Many if not all 
Berberists forcefully insist they are not. But the Berberists’ argument that they are wholly 
insufficient can be conceded in its entirety without this for one moment implying that what 
they are confronting amounts to a denial of their identity. It amounts to a recognition of their 
identity expressed in measures with which they are dissatisfied.  That is a very different 
matter. 
 
The principal focus of Berberist dissatisfaction until recently has been the fact that 
Thamazighth has not been accorded national and official status. The possibility that the state 
has had substantial grounds for withholding this status, and that among these is to be 
numbered the problem that a standard form of Thamazighth, transcending the particular 
regional dialects (Thaqbaïlith, Thashawiyith, etc.) which Algeria’s Berbers actually speak, 
cannot yet be said to exist as a living language, such that there is, quite apart from other 
considerations, a serious practical argument for withholding official status (as a language of 
public administration) from it for the time being, is not admitted.70 But the withholding of 
national and official status from a language does not amount to a denial of its existence. It is 
characteristic of Algerian Berberism that it equates partial recognition with total denial. And 
given this impressive capacity for dissatisfaction, it is not in the least surprising that President 
Bouteflika’s recent announcement of his intention to include the question of national status 
for Thamazighth in the forthcoming constitutional revision should have gone down like a lead 
balloon in Berberist circles.  
 
The Algerian state is probably guilty of many things, but in the matter of le déni identitaire it 
is innocent – or, at any rate, no longer guilty - as charged. The real denial at the centre of this 
story is one which has gone unnoticed and uncomplained of, for very powerful reasons, and it 
is the denial of which Berberism itself is guilty. 
 
                                                 
68 It did this in the preamble to the main text, the French version of which was published by the official news 
agency Algérie Presse Service and reproduced in full in the Journal of Algerian Studies, 2 (1997), 102-132. 
69 Algérie Presse Service, August 7, 2000. 
70 That is, it is not admitted in Berberist political discourse. Berberist intellectuals who have been working 
seriously on the language have become increasingly aware of the complexities and difficulties involved, and are 
now tending to acknowledge these in academic articles; see, for example, Madjid Alaoua, ‘Tamazight dialects 
and the insertion of the Tamazight language in the educational system’, artic le posted on the site of the World 
Amazigh Action Coalition (http://www.waac.org), and notably his admissions that “the Tamazight language 
does not really exist as a homogenous language in the sense of a socio-communicative reality’ and that certain 
dialects, notably the Kabyle and Tuareg dialects, “may be said to constitute separate languages”. 
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Berberism as Kabyle self-denial 
Berberism, while actually about other things, is formally obsessed with the question of 
language to the virtual exclusion of other elements of culture. In this it can be seen to be a 
mirror image of, and retort to, the Arabist outlook as this developed as a powerful current 
within the mainstream of Algerian nationalism. At the same time, it imitates the Arabist 
position in another way: just as the advocates of Arabisation in Algeria have wanted to 
establish the modern standard Arabic that is the lingua franca of the Middle East as the 
Algerian national language at the expense of the colloquial Arabic which most Algerians 
actually speak, so too the Berberists have wanted to establish in Thamazighth a ‘modern 
standard Berber’ at the expense of the Berber dialects.71 In this way, Berberism, despite being 
in the Algerian case a predominantly Kabyle affair, has substituted the promotion of 
Thamazighth for the defence of Thaqbaïlith, and can reconcile the two only by redefining 
them in terms of each other. While Kabyle hegemony within Algerian Berberism makes this 
possible, it encounters a major difficulty in the pan-Berberist dimension of the Berberist 
vision, which requires the Kabyle Berberists to invest in a project which transcends Kabyle 
particularisms if they are to elicit support from the other Berberophone populations and rebut 
the charge of regionalism, which they have gene rally felt they must do if they are to preserve 
their credentials as modernists. 
 
Thus it can be seen that Berberism is not really very interested in Kabyle culture, which is 
why Berberism ignores that aspect of Kabylia which was what actually fascinated and 
preoccupied the French during the consolidation of the colonial conquest in the second half of 
the 19th century – the Kabyle political tradition.  
 
The Kabyle political tradition today has at least six main elements, three which date from 
before the colonial conquest in 1830, two which date from the period between the two world 
wars and one which dates from the late 1940s. The first three closely connected traditions are 
those of:  
 
a.(i)  self-government by the assembly or council (jema‘a or thajma‘ath) of the village 
(thaddarth or toufiq) or of the wider local community comprising several villages, the ‘arsh;  
a.(ii)  representation within the jema‘a by spokesmen (temman) chosen for each constituent 
lineage of the village or each constituent village of the ‘arsh by the man who presides the 
jema‘a, the amin - that is, representation founded on the principle of co-optation;  
a.(iii)  the structuring of debate and conflict within the jema‘a by the action of rudimentary 
parties, the sfuf.72 
 
                                                 
71 As Alaoua (2001) notes, evincing a degree of optimism about the ultimate feasibility of this project 
notwithstanding the realism of his earlier admissions. 
72 For a fuller discussion of the traditional political organization of Kabylia, and especially the nature of the 
jema’a and the role of the temman and sfuf, see my article, ‘The FLN: French conceptions, Algerian realities’, 
in George Joffé (ed.), North Africa: nation, state and region, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp.111-
141. For a discussion of the way in which Kabylia’s political traditions have been misrepresented in 
contemporary academic anthropology, see also Hugh Roberts, ‘Perspectives on Berber politics: on Gellner and 
Masqueray, or Durkheim’s mistake’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (new series), 8 (March 
2002, forthcoming), pp.107-126. 
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The three more recent traditions are: 
 
b.(i)  more or less enthusiastic acceptance of the idea of Progress, whether expressed in 
collaborationist or integrationist (‘assimilationist’) attitudes to the French imperial order or in 
nationalist opposition to it in the name of the very ideals proclaimed by French democracy; 
b.(ii)  acceptance of the nationalist vision which identified Kabylia as part of the Algerian 
nation, the sharing of this vision's separatist project for this nation and consequent hostility to 
French rule and acceptance of the implication of this, namely the need to fight for Algerian 
independence in the name of what all Algerians have in common, including conservative 
attitudes and of course Islam, if need be; 
b.(iii) the tradition of organised irregular warfare as rebellion and as strategy of conquest of 
political power, that is, the tradition of the maquis. 
 
Berberism can properly accommodate only one of these six elements, namely b(i) and it has 
historically done so in both its main variants (integrationist and nationalist) and in recent 
decades and especially since 1989 has tended to lose sight of the distinction between the two 
under the pressure of French patronage. Its attempts in its discourse to accommodate and 
claim legitimating descent from the tradition of the maquis have confronted enormous 
difficulties in the shape of the actual, non-Berberist or frankly anti-Berberist outlook of the 
historical Kabyle maquis of 1954-1962 (quite apart from the pre-emptive claims of the FFS to 
be the authentic emanation of this tradition), and its attempts to exploit this tradition since 
1992 have also been rivaled by those of its Islamist adversaries in the region. 73 
 
Algerian nationalism has accommodated all of these elements of Kabylia’s political tradition 
– none of which are unique to Kabylia - except the collaborationist and integrationists 
variants of b(i), but it has been unable to give satisfactory expression to its accommodation of 
a(i) and a(iii). 
 
Berberism thus is largely neglectful of Kabyle political traditions, and much less 
accommodating of them than the FLN’s version of Algerian nationalism has been. This is 
connected to the fact that Berberism is also unable to accommodate Kabylia's religious 
traditions. 
 
The religious traditions of Kabylia comprise several distinct elements: 
 
  i.  the general tradition that all Kabyles are Muslims, that membership of the political 
community, (‘arsh, thaddarth, jema‘a) is conditional upon membership of the community of 
believers (umma) and that religion is in consequence an intrinsically and fundamentally 
public matter; 
 ii.  the popular tradition of maraboutic Islam - the cult of local patron saints and the 
tradition of deference to the endogamous holy lineages, the mrabtin (in Berber, imrabdhen), 
descended from them; 
                                                 
73 It is not only since the breakdown of 1992 and the development of Islamic guerrilla movements that the 
Islamists have proved able to co-opt the maquis tradition, in Kabylia as elsewhere; between 1989 and 1992, the 
FIS in Kabylia enjoyed the vigorous endorsement of Mohammedi Saïd, the commander of the ALN in wilaya III 
(Kabylia) in 1956-1957. 
 28
iii.  the particular tradition of the turuq (religious orders) since c. 1770;74 
iv. the particular tradition of Kabylia’s participation in the orthodox Islam of the urban 
‘ulama (doctors of Islamic law) from the 17th century onwards through both producing apt 
pupils of same and providing within the region itself certain places of scripturalist Islamic 
learning and instruction which welcomed tolba (students) from elsewhere;75 
the radical tradition of Islamic reform, islah, from the 1920s onwards and especially from 
1931 onwards with the constitution of Ben Badis’s Association of Algerian ‘ulama, in which 
some (but not all) elements of Kabylia’s religious leadership took part.76 
 
Berberism categorically turns its back on the general tradition (i), and especially the 
conception of Islam as an intrinsically public religion which it vehicles, by identifying this 
notion, first, with the Islam of the urban ‘ulama and denying that Kabylia has ever 
participated in this Islam, and, second, with contemporary Islamism or fundamentalism (and 
thus with fanaticism and reaction, if not ‘fascism’). It tacitly accommodates (ii) up to a point, 
as a counterweight to the Islam of the ‘ulama and the Islamists, but dissociates it from (i) in 
the process. It has no interest in (iii) and is either unaware of (iv) and (v) or is in denial about 
them. 
 
Algerian nationalism and especially the FLN-state between 1965 and 1989 have 
accommodated (i), disapproved along islahist or Badisian lines of (ii) and (iii) but embraced 
(iv) and (v) and have tried quietly to accommodate certain elements of (ii) and (iii) in so far 
as they can be converted into a kind of latter-day version of (iv).77 
 
The political traditions which date from before 1830 but which have survived into the post-
colonial era have three very awkward implications for the Berberist ideology: 
 
first, they owe a lot to Arab influence;78 
second, they actually have informed mainstream Algerian politics and especially those of 
Berberism’s historic enemy, the FLN, in ways which cannot be acknowledged without 
disabling the Berberist political critique of the FLN-state;79 
                                                 
74 Kabylia is the birthplace of a tariqa (singular of turuq; literally: ‘a way’, that is, a religious order) known as 
the Rahmaniyya, after its founder, Sidi M’Hammed Ben Abderrahmane Bou Qobrain (c.1715-c.1794). The 
order was established c. 1770 and developed in the course of the 19th century into the largest in Algeria, 
dominant not only in Kabylia but also in the Constantinois. While the mrabtin in Kabylia and elsewhere rallied 
to the order and provided most of its local leadership, the principles on which it functioned were distinct from 
those governing traditional popular deference to hereditary saintly families, as Mohamed Brahim Salhi has 
argued in his doctoral thesis, Étude d’un confrérie religieuse algérienne: la Rahmania à la fin du XIXe siècle et 
dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, October 1979, 
especially pp.53-74. 
75 See Houari Touati, Entre Dieu et les homes: letters, saints et sorciers au Maghreb (XVIIe siècle), Paris: 
Éditions de l’EHESS, 1994 and a most interesting recent doctoral thesis by Kamel Chachoua, Zawaya et 
Zwawa: L’Islam, “la question kabyle” et l’État en Algérie, Paris: EHESS, 1999/2000. 
76 This is discussed in detail by Chachoua (2000). 
77 Thus the Algerian government’s ministry of religious affairs, in developing its network of Islamic Institutes 
across the country, made a point of establishing these in Greater Kabylia in locations long renowned for their 
traditional religious role, the entirely maraboutic village of Aït Bou Yahia at Beni Douala, and the zawiya of 
Sidi Abderrahmane Yillouli at Illoulen Oumalou. 
78 As I have pointed out before (Roberts, 1993b), virtually all the terms employed in the traditional vocabulary 
of honour in Kabylia are of Arabic origin, as are nearly all the terms in the traditional political vocabulary of the 
region (‘arsh, jema’a, temman, sfuf, etc.); it can also be noted that every word in the line of the song by the great 
Kabyle singer-poet Slimane Azem quoted at the front of this paper is in fact Arabic, reflecting the substantial 
element of Arabic which has been absorbed into Thaqbaïlith. 
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third, these traditions have as one of their elements a conception and practice of political 
representation which organises representation by co-optation. 
 
In this last respect, it could be argued that the Kabyle political tradition warrants a full-
blooded critique on modernist democratic grounds, namely that there can be no modern 
democracy in Algeria without a profound questioning of the traditional system of political 
representation, a clear break with it and its replacement by the modern democratic concept of 
representation founded on election. But Berberism cannot furnish this critique. It cannot 
address the third point without acknowledging the truth of the first and second points, and 
these truths are indigestible to it. And because it therefore cannot bring itself to reflect on 
these matters, its actual relationship to the Kabyle political tradition is the relationship of the 
conscious to the unconscious or subconscious; the older part of the Kabyle political tradition, 
which we could call a repressed memory were it not for the fact that it is actually still alive in 
the mountains of Kabylia today, informs the unconscious attitudes of the Berberists and 
actually determines their political conduct. This is why they are so susceptible to co-optation; 
the habits of co-opting and seeking co-optation come naturally to them as Kabyles rather than 
as Berberists, but their Berberism, in its abstract pan-Berberist programmatic vision, disarms 
them politically as Kabyles. As a result, the imported progressive, modernist and secularist 
discourse, while formally a critique of the Algerian state, can be absorbed and even 
intermittently utilised by this state, in the continuously shifting kaleidoscope of its policy 
repertoire, in so far as the bearers of this discourse conform to the state’s expectations of 
them in practice and accept co-optation when required to do so. 
 
The pan-Berberism of Berberism indicates not only a lack of interest in Thaqbaïlith, but an 
indifference to the Kabyle population as the collective possessor of a community of interest. 
Berberism does not consider that there is a Kabyle nation and does not articulate a Kabyle 
national interest or idea. Until now, at any rate, Algerian Berberism has conceived of the 
Kabyles and the other Algerian Berbers as elements of the Algerian nation (for which alone 
the term nation is reserved), while being intent on redefining this nation in line with Berberist 
doctrine. This may change, given the emergence of an explicitly autonomist current in the 
Kabyle Berberist movement,80 since the autonomist project implies the constitution of the 
population of Kabylia into a collective subject possessing the right of self-determination, but 
this has not happened yet. Nor is there any substantive ambition to constitute the Berbers of 
North Africa as a whole into a self-determining political community. What Kabyle Berberism 
articulates is a hostility to the Arabo-Muslim conception of the nation, a hostility to the geo-
political vision of this nation’s place in the world that goes with this conception, 81 and a 
doctrinaire insistence on French political models. It is at home in the French cultural 
ensemble, which accommodates it much as it accommodates other expressions of the ex-
                                                                                                                                                        
79 The way in which the traditions of the jema’a have informed the politics of the FLN is explained in detail in 
Roberts (1993a). 
80 One of the products of the extremely confusing events of last summer has been the birth of a new movement 
called the Mouvement pour l’Autonomie de la Kabylie (MAK), led by Ferhat Mehenni (see footnote 61 above); 
it has also received the support of Professor Salem Chaker. The fact that it has had a largely sceptical if not 
hostile reception in Kabylia itself does not mean that it will not grow, given the crisis of both the RCD and the 
FFS and the absence of a serious prospect of progressive reform of the Algerian state at the national level. For a 
scathing critique of the autonomist perspective by a Kabyle intellectual, see Ramdane Achab, ‘À propos de 
l’autonomie de la Kabylie’, Algeria-Watch (www.algeria-watch.org), November 2001. 
81 The doctrinaire secularism of contemporary political Berberism has led its adepts to develop a clear affinity 
with the Kemalist tradition in Turkey, which has long had an unobtrusive relay in the Tunisian political class as 
well, and to take up the Turkish and Tunisian proclivity to claim, not merely a ‘Mediterranean’ identity, but 
even a European one, a proclivity massively reinforced by the large Kabyle community in France, many of 
whose members have French nationality. 
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colonial (African, Antillais, Indochinese) culture,82 and it is hostile to the nationalist Arabo-
Muslim culture because this is not considered to have accommodated it, and is presumed to 
be incapable of accommodating it, despite the evidence of incremental accommodation over 
the last three decades. 
 
Thus we see a more complex picture now than we did at first. Because Kabyle Berberism is 
not really interested in Kabylia’s linguistic traditions (which it proposes to sacrifice on the 
altar of a largely notional pan-Berber language yet to be brought into existence) or Kabylia’s 
political traditions (except the least specifically Kabyle - progressisme) or its religious 
traditions (except maraboutism, the most backward), it displays a kind of amnesia about them 
all; it has no use for them and forgets them. But, whereas an emerging nationalism can forget 
about pre-national traditions with impunity and succeeds by doing so, this won’t work in this 
case, because rival political forces (the FLN, the Islamists, not to mention the FFS) are there 
to take in hand those Kabyle traditions which the Berberists ignore. Moreover, because 
Kabyle Berberism has not to date been the expression of an emerging Kabyle nationalism, 
and its investment in pan-Berber ideas are not themselves the substance of its political 
project, but the importing of French political models is, the amnesia it displays towards 
Kabylia’s tradition is not something that can take effect in the society of Kabylia as a whole 
unless the Algerian state takes on board the French models and imposes them on the society 
in general and Kabyle society in particular. The main effect of this amnesia is to encumber 
the Berberists themselves with illusions about Kabylia and about the Algerian state, and to 
inhibit them from reflecting on the traditions which their own project requires Algerians to 
supersede. And because these traditions are not reflected on, they continue to inform the 
political behaviour of the Berberists themselves, which is accordingly characterised by 
systematic mauvaise foi.  
 
This bad faith, and the divided state of mind underlying it, were graphically illustrated in the 
early stages of the disturbances in Kabylia in the spring of 2001. 
 
Misrepresenting Kabylia 
I have noted above that the RCD proffered a definition of the causes of the unrest in Kabylia 
which failed to reflect the actual outlook and grievances of the rioters. This was not done 
without a most interesting exercise in throat-clearing, however.  
 
On April 24, after rioting had been in progress for 24 hours across both Greater and Lesser 
Kabylia, the RCD’s office in Tizi Ouzou published the following communiqué: 
 
Déclaration du Bureau Régional du RCD de Tizi Ouzou 
Les villages de Beni Douala et Tizi Hibel viennent d’enterrer dignement un de 
leurs enfants, M. GUERMAH Massinissa, decédé des suites de blessures par 
balles reçues dans les locaux de la brigade de gendarmerie de Beni Douala, le 18 
avril dernier. 
Légitime, la révolte de la jeunesse de Beni Douala qui a répondu à cet évènement 
tragique et qui a occasionné malheureusement des dégâts sur les biens publics, 
                                                 
82 In this context, it can be said that we are witnessing the rapid development of what we might well call a 
‘South French’ culture and identity, by analogy with the ‘West British’ culture that has now all but 
overwhelmed public (intellectual, artistic and political) life in the Irish Republic at the expense of Irish national 
traditions. 
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traduit un désespoir comprehensible face à la persistence d’abus et d’exclusions 
aussi divers qu’injustes. 
Le darki auteur de la gravissime faute commise à l’encontre du regretté 
GUERMAH est identifié. 
Le Bureau régional du RCD de Tizi-Ouzou exige une sanction exemplaire. 
Par ailleurs, solidaire de la revendication des citoyens de Beni Douala concernant 
la mise en place d’une sûreté de daïra, les dirigeants du RCD ont déjà entamé les 
démarches en ce sens, interventions qui semblent rencontrer un écho favorable. 
En ces circonstances difficiles et comme de coutume, les voix des pompiers 
pyromanes habituels s’élèvent dans une tentative de récupérer et d’infiltrer la 
juste indignation populaire. 
Survenant, en effet, parallèlement à une bavure commise par le même corps de 
sécurité à Oued Amizour, dans la wilaya de Bejaïa, ce mécontentement 
compréhensible fait déjà l’objet de convoitises de forces connues pour leur 
promotion de la stratégie du pire. Chacun aura déjà constaté leurs tentatives 
sournoises visant à étendre et dévoyer la légitime colère populaire vers des mots 
d’ordre étranger à ses aspirations naturelles. 
C’est le droit absolu de notre jeunesse de dénoncer et de s’opposer à toute atteinte 
à l’intégrité et aux droits des citoyens. Mais elle doit savoir que les édifices et 
infrastructures divers de la région sont d’abord les siens et doivent être épargnés. 
Comme dans tout combat pour la dignité, plus que jamais, la vigilance doit être le 
credo de tous. 
Tizi Ouzou, le 24/04/2001. 
P/le RCD. 
Le Président du Bureau régional de Tizi Ouzou. 83 
 
This declaration was remarkable in at least four respects. First, it represented what was at 
issue in Kabylia last April as being the question of the persistence of various unjust ‘abuses 
and exclusions’ and ‘attacks on the integrity and rights of citizens’, as well as the specific 
incidents in Beni Douala and Oued Amizour, and thus faithfully articulated the 
demonstrators’ revolt against la hogra in terms which would be immediately intelligible to 
the numerous victims of la hogra elsewhere in Algeria Second, the declaration articulated 
and supported the specific practical demand of the population of Beni Douala for a police 
station to be established in their district, a demand grounded in the fact that the police – la 
Sûreté Nationale – has traditionally behaved properly towards the local populations, in 
flagrant contrast to the widely execrated Gendarmerie. Third, while accurately representing 
popular feeling and proclaiming the RCD’s solidarity with the ‘legitimate revolt’ of Kabyle 
youth, the declaration not only warned (very presciently) against attempts to infiltrate and 
pervert the movement but specifically insisted that the demonstrators should not attack public 
buildings, but should regard and respect them as their own collective property. Fourth, the 
declaration made not the slightest attempt to suggest that the identity and language questions 
were at issue, and made not a single reference to these concerns. 
 
The very same day, a communiqué was also published by the regional office of the RCD in 
Bejaïa.84 This declaration also invoked the incidents in Beni Douala and Oued Amizour, but 
said nothing about ‘abuses and exclusions’ or the ‘rights of citizens’ or a ‘citizen’s combat 
                                                 
83 Source: RCD Internet Bulletin, April 2001 (http://rcd-algérie.org/avril/avril.htm); darki (plural: darak ) means 
‘gendarme’. 
84 Déclaration du Bureau Régional du RCD de Bejaïa, Bejaïa, April 24, RCD Internet Bulletin, April 2001 
(http://rcd-algérie.org/avril/avril.htm). 
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for dignity’. Instead, it noted that the incidents which triggered the protests had occurred “in 
regions known for their attachment to the cause of Amazigh identity” and that “this revolt of 
the younger generation expresses in fact the indignation of a population put off by the 
permanent refusal of its identity and cultural claims.” This definition of the issue in the 
second paragraph of the declaration was repeated in the fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs, to 
the complete exclusion of anything else which might have been at stake, including the local 
demand for a district police station. The contrast with the position taken by the RCD in Tizi 
Ouzou was massive. 
 
The following day, the national leadership of the RCD published a declaration of its 
executive committee which arbitrated the disagreement between its two regional bureaux in 
favour of Bejaia.85 While implicitly alluding to the problem of hogra in a passing mention of  
“contempt and abuse of authority”, the executive committee insisted that “the explosion 
recorded once more in Kabylia is first of all the consequence of an immense feeling of 
frustration born of the denial which the State opposes to a peaceful and popular claim 
expressed and reaffirmed each year with vigour”, an unmistakeable reference to the identity 
claim which the Berberist movement habitually renews and reasserts every year in 
celebrating in April the anniversary of the ‘Berber Spring’ of 1980. The rest of the 
declaration continued in this vein, invoking “a younger generation ignored in its identity…”, 
“the Amazigh claim…” and “the identity question”. A subsequent communiqué published in 
Algiers on April 28, by which time at least 35 demonstrators had been shot dead in Kabylia, 
confirmed this orientation, referring to the identity issue five times and raising no other 
demand for the population to mobilise behind or the government to concede.86 
 
In other words, the initial impulse of the RCD activists on the ground, in the wilaya of Tizi 
Ouzou where the disturbances began, to reflect the outlook of the population and represent its 
practical concerns and demands was firmly, consciously and completely overridden. Why the 
Bejaia leadership should have differed from its counterpart in Tizi Ouzou is unclear, although 
the fact that the Vice-President of the RCD, Djamel Ferdjallah, is from Bejaia may have had 
a lot to do with it. But there is no doubt whatever that the national leadership in Algiers 
refused to endorse the view taken by its Tizi Ouzou bureau and, in choosing between 
representing the population and representing the Berberist agenda, gave exclusive preference 
to the latter.  
 
That the RCD should have done this is not surprising in itself, that is to say, if we view it in 
abstraction from its context. Political parties which are founded on a particular programmatic 
vision are liable to cling to this vision at the expense of popular support if need be when 
forced to choose between the two. What is surprising is that the RCD leaders should have felt 
that they were faced with this choice in the actual circumstances which obtained in Kabylia in 
April 2001. For in rebelling against la hogra, the demonstrators in Kabylia were expressing 
opposition to the régime, not to the Berberist agenda. Why, then, should the RCD leadership 
have considered that it had to misrepresent popular sentiment in Kabylia, not to mention 
override and disavow its own militants in Tizi Ouzou, in order to defend the Berberist 
agenda, instead of adopting a position which articulated a synthesis (or at least combination) 
of the two?  
 
This question can best be considered in conjunction with a second one. 
                                                 
85 Le Comité Exécutif met le régime devant ses responsabilités: declaration of RCD Executive Committee, 
Algiers, April 25, loc cit.. 
86 La situation est grave, RCD communiqué, Algiers, April 28, 2001, loc. cit. 
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On May 1, 2001, three days after confirming its line on the situation in Kabylia, the RCD 
announced that it was quitting the governing coalition. 87 It did not do this because President 
Bouteflika or his prime minister, Ali Benflis, had refused to accept the RCD’s conditions for 
remaining in the government, for the RCD had not posed any such conditions. At no point 
between the start of the riots on April 23 and its decision to leave the government on May 1 
had the national leadership of the RCD called on the government to take specific practical 
measures in respect of the troubles in Kabylia as the price of its continued support. At no 
point did the RCD leaders use the threat of reverting to opposition as a lever with which to 
secure concessions for its notional constituency, that is, engage in the kind of political 
manoeuvre which comes naturally to representative political parties taking part in coalition 
governments. Is it possible that the RCD leaders, while arguably deluded about other matters, 
know very well what they are themselves about, and that this does not include substantive 
opposition of any kind, and that it was accordingly pointless to issue idle threats to engage in 
this? 
 
There is every reason to think that the answer to this second question is yes, and that the 
answer to the two questions taken together is that the Berberist form of politics, since 
mutating into the RCD, has never been in the business of serious as distinct from token 
opposition and is intrinsically incapable of it. 
 
From dissidence to co-optation, or the French connection revisited 
Berberism, the political preoccupation with the question of the contemporary Kabyle identity 
as an identity which has come to possess French elements and is ill at ease within the 
Algerian national identity, is dissident rather than oppositional. This is closely connected with 
its inability, which we have demonstrated, to function as a representative politics even in the 
Kabyle context.  
 
Kabyle society is far more complex in the cultural sphere than is usually recognised. Kabyle 
culture includes Berber, Islamic, Arab and Ottoman elements as well as a French element. 
Berberism's unacknowledged preoccupation with the French element of Kabyle culture and 
its corresponding obsession with French political and constitutional models disable it from 
representing the actual material interests of Kabyle society as it is within the framework of 
the Algerian political system as this is. This weakness in the Berberist outlook was only latent 
until 1989, but was enormously aggravated by the mutation of the Berberist movement into 
the RCD in that year and the latter’s explicit adoption of secularism as its programmatic 
priority. 
 
In adopting secularism and making it the main plank of its platform, the RCD embraced a 
demand which had never been a popular aspiration in Kabylia or anywhere else in Algeria, 
but was strictly confined to the Francophile wing of elite and middle class circles inside the 
country. But there is an element of the broader Algerian population which has long evinced a 
tendency to the secularist position without this being subjectively associated with or confined 
to an elitist outlook. This element is the Algerian émigré community in France, in which the 
Kabyles have long held pride of place and where political Berberism originated. 
 
                                                 
87 Le RCD se retire du gouvernement. Résolution de la session extraordinaire du Conseil National du RCD du 
1er Mai 2001, loc .cit. 
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In a predominantly Christian country, the secularist principle, the separation of Church and 
State, naturally works to the benefit of a Muslim minority within the population, since it 
tends to limit the disadvantage this minority incurs by virtue of its faith. In addition to this 
general factor inclining Algerian émigrés to appreciate French secularism, the participation of 
many émigré workers in the organisations of the French labour movement (trade unions and 
political parties) undoubtedly encouraged them to pick up the secularist assumptions of their 
French colleagues. It is these factors which help to explain the outlook expressed by Ali 
Yahia and his colleagues in 1948-1949. And although their dissidence was suppressed within 
the PPA-MTLD, and eradicated for a generation within Kabylia itself, it was not eradicated 
within Algerian nationalist politics in France. 
 
When the constitution of the newly independent state was being debated by the various 
factions of the FLN in 1962-1963, the émigré wing of the movement, the Fédération de 
France du FLN, explicitly canvassed a secular constitution. It was the only organised element 
of the FLN as a whole to do so, and was overruled. The leader of the FFFLN from 1957 to 
1962 was a Kabyle, Omar Boudaoud. Most of the other leading figures in the FFFLN during 
the war were Kabyles, notably Bachir Boumaza, Mourad Terbouche, Salah Louanchi, Amar 
Ladlani and Ali Haroun, 88 a fact which reflected the predominance of Kabyles within the 
rank and file of the nationalist struggle in the metropolis. Most of these figures played no role 
in the government of the FLN-state after 1962. As a result, a connection was established in 
the minds of this generation between secularism and dissent from the official orthodoxy of 
the FLN-state as this actually evolved under its first two presidents, Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-
1965) and Houari Boumediène (1965-1978).  
 
In the course of the 1980s, as more and more elements of the old nationalist outlook of the 
Boumediène era were being abandoned by the Chadli régime, certain figures linked to the old 
FFFLN and who adhered to its old secularist outlook began discreetly to surface in 
government positions. The most important of these was Aboubakr Belkaïd, who, having held 
a succession of portfolios in the government since 1984,89 was appointed to the crucial 
interior ministry in November 1988, in which post he handled the business of recognizing the 
new political parties which blossomed after the promulgation of the pluralist constitution in 
February 1989. Belkaïd himself was not a Kabyle, but a native of Tlemcen in western 
Algeria. As such, he undoubtedly owed his position to the sponsorship of the most powerful 
figure from western Algeria in the Chadli régime, the secretary-general of the presidency, 
General Larbi Belkheir, one of the coterie of ex-officers of the French army who rallied to the  
FLN-ALN in the last years of the war of liberation, and widely regarded as the leader of the 
pro-French tendency within the Algerian political élite.90 
 
                                                 
88 Ali Haroun is also the author of a history of the FFFLN, La Septième wilaya: la guerre du FLN en France, 
1954-1962, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986. 
89 Belkaïd was deputy minister for urban planning in charge of construction (1984-1986), minister of vocational 
training and labour (1986-1987) and minister of higher education (1987-1988) before assuming the interior 
portfolio in November 1988. 
90 That is, the tendency known as hizb frança (‘the Party of France’); the fact that this is a polemical term in 
Algerian politics, and liable to be applied somewhat indiscriminately, does not mean that hizb frança does not 
exist, and that Larbi Belkheir is a key, if not the key, figure at the Algerian end of the Algeria-France 
relationship since 1980 is widely acknowledged in both French and Algerian circles. For a frankly partisan but 
fascinating account, see Abdelhamid Brahimi, Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000): témoignage 
sur hizb frança, Geneva & London: Hoggar Books, 2000. 
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It was Belkheir’s close ally, El-Hadi Khediri, 91 who as interior minister in 1987 had piloted 
through the Algerian national assembly the Law on Associations which subverted the 
monopoly previously enjoyed by the Party of the FLN over Algerian public life, and it was 
Khediri who contacted Saïd Sadi in October 1988 to enlist Sadi’s help in ensuring that the 
riots engulfing Algiers and many other cities did not spread to Kabylia.92 It was Khediri’s 
successor, Belkaïd, who liaised with Sadi over the matter of the recognition of the RCD 
thereafter and who, as minister ‘in charge of relations with Parliament and the associations’ 
in the government of Sid Ahmed Ghozali in 1991-92, handled the government’s relations 
with the various political parties in the critical period both before and after the legislative 
elections of December 1991. And it was Belkaïd’s old colleague from the FFFLN, Ali 
Haroun, who, as minister of human rights in Ghozali’s government, personally provided an 
element of ‘democratic’ legitimation for the army’s coup in January 1992 by joining the five-
man High State Committee (Haut Comité d’État , HCE) set up by the army to fill the vacant 
presidency for the balance of Chadli’s uncompleted term. 
 
It is possible that the RCD’s support for the army and the HCE in 1992, the convergence if 
not identity of the views it expressed with the position incarnated by Haroun, was secured 
without this depending on any deliberate consultations between Haroun and Sadi. But it is 
inconceivable that the RCD committed itself to secularism in 1989 against the wishes or 
advice of Belkaïd and Belkheir, since it depended on their approval if it was to secure 
legalisation as a political party within the new constitution. And it is entirely possible, if not 
probable, that it made this commitment at their explicit suggestion and prompting. By doing 
so, the RCD adopted a position which was in tune with the subjective outlook of much of the 
Kabyle community in France, but which severely limited its appeal in Algeria and in Kabylia 
itself to the new intelligentsia and middle class. 
 
The suggestion I made twenty years ago that the Berberist movement vehiculed at bottom a 
bourgeois interest was grounded in an analysis of the underlying structural trends in Kabyle 
society and politics, and appeared to receive no confirmation from the social profile of the 
protests which erupted in Kabylia in the ‘Berber spring’ – Tafsut Imazighen – of March-April 
1980. The region-wide scale of the movement and its trans-class character, with the workers 
at the SONITEX factory at Draa Ben Khedda going on strike and the populations of 
numerous villages mobilizing en masse in support of the university and high-school students 
who were the fer-de-lance of the protests, conveyed the impression that the Berberist 
movement articulated the outlook and interests of the population as a whole and may have 
appeared to refute my thesis.93 But to draw this conclusion is to overlook the fact that the 
movement in 1980 was united only in what it opposed, and not at all united in support of a 
positive project or demand, for in its positive aspect the movement was split between the 
mutually contradictory visions of cultural pluralism, Amazigh revivalism and laissez-faire as 
we have seen. The behaviour of the workers who went on strike and the villagers who 
descended on Tizi Ouzou cannot be assumed to have reflected a developed political 
                                                 
91 El Hadi Khediri was for many years Directeur Général de la Sûreté Nationale, that is, the chief of the 
Algerian police, before taking up the interior portfolio in 1987. He was demoted to the transport portfolio in 
1988 and left government office in 1989, although remaining an influential figure behind the scenes. 
92 As Khediri has frankly admitted; see his interview in Sid Ahmed Semiane (ed.), Octobre: Ils Parlent, Algiers, 
Éditions Le Matin, 1998, pp.101-102. 
93 In formally recycling Salem Chaker’s disagreement (1985) with me on this point, Mahé (2001), pp.449-50, 
471 fn) has – unlike Professor Chaker – gravely misrepresented the articles and theses of mine to which he 
refers, while omitting to justify his criticism with serious arguments or to acknowledge that important elements 
of his own analysis were in fact put forward in the articles and thesis in question, over a decade before he began 
to proffer his own, undoubtedly valuable, contribution to the study of Kabylia.  
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commitment to the Berberist project, which was largely inchoate at this juncture, but rather to 
have expressed a natural and instinctive reflex of solidarity with their own children, younger 
brothers and sisters and cousins the moment the latter found themselves on the receiving end 
of the state’s repression. It was thus above all a response to a provocation. And it should not 
be forgotten that the initial protests of the Berberist students were themselves a response to a 
provocation, the gratuitous banning by the wali (governor) of Tizi Ouzou of a scheduled 
lecture at Tizi Ouzou university by Mouloud Mammeri.94 And in so far as the scale of the 
protests reflected a generalized response to provocation, they expressed the entirely 
traditional values of the code of honour, the imperative defence of nif, self-respect, as much 
as if not more than a preoccupation with language and culture, or anything else for that 
matter. 
 
The disposition of Kabyle society to mobilise when necessary in defence of its younger 
generation was an enormous source of moral support to the Berberist agitators throughout the 
1980s, and enabled them to display the courage of their convictions in standing up to the state 
for as long as the state sustained its repressive attitude. But the mutation of the FLN-state into 
the formally pluralist state established in 1989 transformed the premises of political action on 
all sides. In inviting the Berberists to constitute themselves into a political party, the state 
appeared to convert itself from a brick wall into an open door, and made them an offer they 
could not refuse. It thereby induced the Berberist leaders to revise their own attitudes, and to 
orient themselves in a positive manner towards those elements of the régime who had been 
responsible for the opening which had occurred. It accordingly complicated their attitude 
towards the régime, and stimulated the development of subjective considerations in the minds 
of the Berberist leaders which tended to inhibit them from developing the RCD into a party of 
substantive opposition. 
 
In committing the RCD to the secularist agenda, the RCD distanced itself from a large 
element of the potential Kabyle constituency for Berberist politics. It should not be forgotten 
that part of the population of Kabylia was initially attracted to the Islamists’ position, 95 that 
many Islamists were not hostile to the Berberist position on the language issue, but on the 
contrary inclined to accept this, and that much of the Kabyle population of Algiers supported 
the FIS in 1989-1991.96 Thus the way in which the RCD resolved the confusion which had 
obtained in the positive aspects of the Berberist agenda since 1980, retaining the cultural-
pluralist position while subordinating it to the entirely novel element represented by the 
secularist demand, tended to alienate elements of the Kabyle community and to contract 
rather than expand the support base for the party’s demands on the language issue, and so 
reduce its capacity to sustain an independent attitude and posture towards the régime. At the 
same time, in allowing other forces unencumbered by the secularist dogma (the FIS and the 
                                                 
94 Mammeri was intercepted on his way to Tizi Ouzou on March 10, 1980, apparently on the orders of the wali. 
Since the subject of his scheduled lecture was the uninflammatory theme of his new book on Berber poetry, and 
he had recently been allowed to deliver a similar lecture in Constantine, the motivations of the authorities on this 
occasion were far from self-evident. 
95 The notion that the Kabyles were unanimously hostile to the FIS owed a lot to the fact that the FIS did not 
actually contest most of the municipalities in the wilayât of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia in 1990, for reasons that are 
unclear. In the neighbouring wilayât of Bouïra and Boumerdès, the FIS contested all seats and came first in both 
cases; in those few municipalities in Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia which it did contest, it polled quite well, and 
actually won control of the APC’s of Draa el Mizan and Sidi Naamane in Tizi Ouzou and Dra el Caïd in Bejaia. 
In 1991, it polled strongly in the parliamentary constituency of Tizi Ouzou, coming second to the FFS candidate 
and forcing none other than Saïd Sadi into third place. 
96 The FFS’s support for the relegalisation of the FIS from 1992 onwards, following the dissolution of the latter, 
is likely to have been informed by the FFS leaders’ awareness that many Kabyles in Algiers had voted for the 
FIS, and that it was politic to show consideration for their outlook. 
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FFS) to mobilise the populist and other traditions in Kabylia, the RCD came increasingly to 
depend upon and reflect the interests and outlook of the Kabyle middle class in general and 
the bourgeoisie stricto sensu. 
 
It is a striking fact about Kabyle politics since 1989 that the FFS, while able to claim majority 
support in the region in 1990-1991 and for much of the time since then, has never managed to 
establish a daily paper of its own or benefit from the regular support of a notionally 
independent paper, whereas the RCD has enjoyed the constant support of one of Algeria’s 
best known French-language dailies, Liberté. Liberté is edited by Outoudert Abrous and is 
owned by Kabylia’s most celebrated millionaire, the business tycoon, Issaad Rabrab. Abrous 
is from the village of Taguemount Azzouz, which is likely to be connected with the fact that 
Rabrab is from this village as well. Taguemount Azzouz was one of the main centres of the 
missionary activity of the French White Fathers during the later colonial period.97 It is the 
leading village of the Aït Mahmoud tribe, which also includes the villages of Taourirt 
Moussa, the home of Matoub Lounes, and Tizi Hibel, the native village of the great Kabyle 
writer Mouloud Feraoun and of the young Massinissa Guermah, whose death triggered the 
disturbances last April.  
 
The attitude of the new generation of Algerian businessmen towards the Algerian state is not 
one of hostility, but of conditional cooperation. While the Algerian state is very far from 
offering a political framework conducive to the general development of capitalist enterprise, 
the subjective outlook of the men who staff the régime includes a disposition to accommodate 
the interests of particular businessmen, and an incestuous and hectic culture characterised by 
the reciprocal rendering of services and favours has developed in élite circles. As a result, the 
most dynamic elements of the new bourgeoisie are those with entrées at the highest levels, a 
fact which encourages them to take out various forms of political insurance but inhibits them 
from investing in the politics of genuine democratic reform. Their business ventures depend 
on their relations with the executive of the state rather than the legislature, and for as long as 
the former deliver for them they have no interest in making an issue, or subsidizing others to 
make an issue, of the extremely stunted nature of the legislature’s role and its prostration 
before the executive.  
 
These various considerations make it possible to understand the RCD’s situation over the last 
decade, and the particular political positions it has canvassed. It is entirely possible that they 
also explain the RCD’s decision to boycott the presidential election in 1999, if the widely 
circulated rumour that Rabrab was personally investing in Bouteflika’s candidacy is true.  
 
Because it does not represent a substantial Kabyle interest inside Algeria beyond that of an 
élite minority on the make, political Berberism since mutating into the RCD cannot stand up 
to the Algerian government in any serious way. It accordingly expresses an ideological 
protest against the official nationalist conception of the nation-state and an ideological 
criticism of the political system of the nation-state rather than a political disposition to oppose 
the government in earnest by advancing practical demands or canvassing realisable political 
reforms. From 1989 onwards, the tendency to indulge rhe torically in Berberist dissidence has 
                                                 
97 The village is the subject of a most interesting monograph by H. Genevois, Taguemount Azouz des Beni 
Mahmoud: Notes d’histoire et de folklore, Fichier de Documentation Berbère, Fort-National (now Larbaa n’Aït 
Irathen), 1972. The Fichier, which published numerous invaluable studies on Kabylia until it was closed by the 
Algerian authorities in 1976, was run by the White Fathers (Pères Blancs), of whom Genevois was a leading 
light. 
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gone hand in hand with a tendency to accept co-optation by the régime on the most 
conservative, if not regressive, basis, providing ‘democratic’ legitimation to the army’s 
attitude towards democratic principles in January 1992 and since then, and ‘modernist’ and 
‘republican’ endorsement of President Bouteflika’s supposed credentials in these respects in 
July 1999.  
 
In travestying the outlook of the desperate, young, unemployed rioters last April, the RCD 
was misrepresenting an element of the Kabyle population which it had long been uninterested 
in representing in any case. And, in quitting the government in May 2001, the RCD was not 
breaking with the régime at all. For, while its decision and the rhetoric which accompanied it 
may have been personally embarrassing for President Bouteflika, there can be no doubt that 
the line which the RCD had already adopted on the unrest worked to the interest of the 
régime as a whole, by pre-empting the proper political articulation of the Kabyles’ refusal of 
la hogra, by misrepresenting the unrest as the product of identity concerns all but peculiar to 
the region and therefore facilitating the régime’s efforts to confine the unrest to Kabylia 
alone, and by simultaneously sowing confusion within the Kabyle population itself. 
 
In other words, the co-optation of Berberism since its mutation into the RCD in 1989 has 
been permanent. The formal presence of the RCD in the governing coalition or its formal 
absence from this have been neither here nor there.  
 
Berberism has accordingly proved incapable of secreting or reinforcing the substance of a 
democratic politics in Algeria. Ever since the riots of October 1988, when the Algerian state 
went into flux, Berberism has proved extremely susceptible to manipulation by various forces 
at the expense of the democratic interest in Algeria. And because the immediate effect of 
political Berberism has been to ensure the misrepresentation of the Kabyle population, it has 
contributed very directly to the fact that this population, like that of the rest of the country, 
has continued to be denied genuine as opposed to purely formal enfranchisement, has not 
enjoyed the substance of citizenship, and has accordingly been permanently vulnerable to the 
numerous and varied abuses in which the Algerian authorities routinely engage.  
 
Thus Berberism has had not only its share of the responsibility for the polarisation of 
Algerian politics between rival (Islamist, secularist) brands of intolerant utopianism in 1989-
1991 and for the subsequent catastrophic descent into violence, but also a large share of the 
responsibility for the persistence of the problem of la hogra, the fundamental problem of the 
state-society relationship in contemporary Algeria, and for the violence which is the 
inseparable corollary of this problem.  
 
From Berberism to democracy 
Given the distinctive aspects of their culture, the Kabyles may certainly be considered to have 
a particular interest of their own in the eventual democratisation of the Algerian state, in that 
the democratisation of the Algerian state is the precondition of the de-politicisation of the 
cultural issue, which is in turn the precondition of the emancipation of the Kabyles from 
whatever social and political disadvantage they may informally incur in consequence of their 
status as a minority in the cultural sphere. But the Kabyles will be able to contribute 
effectually to the democratisation of the Algerian state, and thus become the artisans of their 
wider political emancipation, only when those who aspire to lead them have first outgrown 
the infantile disorder of Berberist dissidence, and inoculated themselves against the 
susceptibility to political manipulation with which this infects them.  
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How might they effect this revolution in their political outlook? 
 
I have argued that Berberism does not primarily express a concern for the preservation and 
promotion of the Berber element of the Kabyle identity so much as the French element. This 
has been stated as a fact, not as a debating point, and certainly not in order to de- legitimate 
Berberism, as its Arabist critics have done, on cultural-nationalist grounds which it would be 
inappropriate for me, as a non-Algerian, to invoke. The significance of the fact in question is 
not that it may or may not be perceived as making Berberism illegitimate in national terms, 
but that it disables its political adepts both from representing their notional constituency and 
from realising their own notional democratic purpose. In short, the fundamental implication 
of the fact in question is that, as a movement with significant ambitions, Berberism is self-
defeating. But, while I believe this fact is important and illuminating, it is not the end of the 
matter.  
 
The attachment of the Berberists in 1948-49 to the idea of l'Algérie algérienne expressed the 
Kabyles’ attachment to the idea of a modern democratic republic à la française. This 
attachment articulated a combination of three things: the Kabyles’ own democratic political 
impulses, derived from the tradition of a polity - the Kabyle cité, in Masqueray’s perceptive 
term98 - in which every man was an enfranchised citizen and had the right to express, and 
expect consideration for, his point of view; their subsequent enthusiasm for the idea of 
Progress as imbibed from the French, and the fact that they had become familiar with the 
French model of the modern state but with no other model, in part because Kabyle labour 
migration was oriented very largely to France, and in part because the universalist pretensions 
of the French political tradition had discouraged curiosity about other models. 
 
French colonial rule put a definitive end to the Kabyle tradition of independence of the 
central power. But it did not put an end to the democratic impulses of the Kabyles, it 
reoriented these to the aspiration to belong to a wider state in which these impulses might be 
accommodated. In short, it bred the aspiration to accede to the status of fully enfranchised 
citizens within a modern state. For as long as the framework of l'Algérie française seemed 
capable of being reformed so as to accommodate these aspirations, it was natural for Kabyle 
intellectuals to be interested in the integrationist perspective. When it became clear that this 
option was a mirage, it was equally natural for Kabyles to rally to the separatist cause while 
retaining their aspiration for a democratic state, which they were still inclined to conceive 
along French lines, since no other model was familiar to them. Thus the demand for l'Algérie 
algérienne translated the desire for an independent Algerian state which would be as 
democratic as the French republic, indeed which would realise in respect of the Algerian 
Muslims the very democratic principles that France in Algeria refused to honour. 
 
It follows that Berberism, in vehicling a preoccupation with the French element of Kabyle 
cultural identity, has actually been the disguised mediation of something else, namely the 
Kabyles’ democratic aspirations. The problem is that the mediation has worked out, in the 
actual context of the degraded FLN-state and as a consequence of the relationship which the 
Berberist leaders have entered into with this state, as a terrible distortion of these aspirations 
and a perpetual diversion from them which has tended relentlessly to constitute itself into a 
massive obstacle to them.  
                                                 
98 Émile Masqueray, Formation des cités chez les populations sedentaires de l’Algérie, Paris: Laval, 1986; 
reprinted with an Introduction by Fanny Colonna, Centre de Recherches et d’Études sur les Sociétés 
Mediterranéenes, Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1983. 
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The actual effect of Berberism has been to prevent the Kabyles from emancipating their 
democratic aspirations from their historically contingent and limiting implication in French 
culture as the precondition of their expressing these aspirations directly, in the shape of 
reasoned demands for realisable political reforms, and in a manner which makes them 
intelligible and acceptable to other Algerians. It has done this by inhibiting the Kabyles from 
acknowledging both the universal quality of their democratic aspirations - that is, precisely 
the quality which transcends the particularist aspect of the French democratic tradition (that 
is, above all, its secularist dimension) - and their particular historical roots in the Kabyles’ 
own political traditions, which are characteristically Algerian political traditions.  
 
Berberism has accordingly induced the Kabyles to lose sight of the affinity of their 
democratic aspirations with the central political substance of the Algerian national idea, the 
demand for citizenship, that is, for self-determination as the condition of political obligation 
and for substantive enfranchisement as the condition of human dignity. It is this affinity that 
they need to rediscover, recognise and build on. Given the interest of forces inside and 
outside Algeria in perpetuating the Berberist snare and delusion, the true democrats in 
Kabylia have a mountain to climb, but they have climbed mountains before. 
 
 
 41
Abbreviations  
 
APC Assemblée Populaire Communale  
APN Assemblée Populaire Nationale  
APW Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya 
FFFLN Fédération de France du FLN 
FFS Front des Forces Socialistes 
FIS Front Islamique du Salut 
FLN Front de Libération Nationale  
HCA Haut Commissariat à l’Amazighité 
LADDH Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme 
LADH Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l’Homme 
MCB Mouvement Culturel Berbère 
MN Mouvement de la Nahda (often referred to simply as En-Nahda) 
MSP Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix 
MTLD Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques 
OS Organisation Spéciale  
PPA Parti du Peuple Algérien 
RCD Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie  
RND Rassemblement National Démocratique 
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